Macroeconomic Analysis Without the Rational Expectations Hypothesis by Woodford, Michael
 Columbia University 
 
Department of Economics 


























Department of Economics 
Columbia University 










This paper reviews a variety of alternative approaches to the specication of
the expectations of economic decisionmakers in dynamic models, and reconsid-
ers familiar results in the theory of monetary and scal policy when one allows
for departures from the hypothesis of rational expectations. The various ap-
proaches are all illustrated in the context of a common model, a log-linearized
New Keynesian model in which both households and rms solve innite-horizon
decision problems; under the hypothesis of rational expectations, the model re-
duces to the standard \3-equation model" used in studies such as Clarida et
al. (1999). The alternative approaches considered include rationalizable equi-
librium dynamics (Guesnerie, 2008); restricted perceptions equilibria (Branch,
2004); decreasing-gain and constant-gain variants of least-squares learning dy-
namics (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001); rational belief equilibria (Kurz, 2012);
and near-rational expectations equilibria (Woodford, 2010). Issues treated in-
clude Ricardian equivalence; the determinacy of equilibrium under alternative
interest-rate rules; non-fundamental sources of aggregate instability; the trade-
o between ination stabilization and output-gap stabilization; and the possi-
bility of a \deation trap."
Prepared for Annual Review of Economics, volume 5. I would like to thank Klaus Adam,
Ben Hebert, Mordecai Kurz, David Laibson, and Bruce Preston for helpful discussions, Savitar
Sundaresan for research assistance, and the Institute for New Economic Thinking and the Taussig
Visiting Professorship, Harvard University, for supporting this research.
A crucial methodological question in macroeconomic analysis is the way in which
the expectations of decisionmakers about future conditions should be modeled. To the
extent that behavior is modeled as goal-directed, it will depend (except in the most
trivial cases) on expectations; and analyses of the eects of alternative governmental
policies need to consider how expectations are endogenously inuenced by one policy
or another. Finding tractable ways to address this issue has been a key challenge
for the extension of optimization-based economic analysis to the kinds of dynamic
settings required for most questions of interest in macroeconomics.
The dominant approach for the past several decades, of course, has made use of
the hypothesis of model-consistent or \rational expectations" (RE): the assumption
that people have probability beliefs that coincide with the probabilities predicted
by one's model. The RE benchmark is a natural one to consider, and its use has
allowed a tremendous increase in the sophistication of the analysis of dynamics in the
theoretical literature in macroeconomics. Nonetheless, the assumption is a strong one,
and one may wonder if it should be relaxed, especially when considering relatively
short-run responses to disturbances, or the consequences of newly adopted policies
that have not been followed in the past | both of which are precisely the types of
situations which macroeconomic analysis frequently seeks to address.
While the assumption that an economy's dynamics must necessarily correspond to
an RE equilibrium may seem unjustiably strong | and under some circumstances, is
a heroic assumption indeed | it does not follow that we should then be equally willing
to entertain all possible assumptions about the expectations of economic agents. It
makes sense to assume that expectations should not be completely arbitrary, and
have no relation to the kind of world in which the agents live; indeed, it is appealing
to assume that people's beliefs should be rational, in the ordinary-language sense,
though there is a large step from this to the RE hypothesis.1 We should like, therefore,
to replace the RE hypothesis by some weaker restriction, that nonetheless implies a
substantial degree of conformity between people's beliefs and reality | that implies,
at the least, that people do not make obvious mistakes.
The literature has explored two broad approaches to the formulation of a criterion
for reasonableness of beliefs that is weaker than the RE hypothesis. One is to assume
that people should correctly understand the economic model, and be able to form
correct inferences from it about possible future outcomes. The other is to assume that
that the probabilities that people assign to possible future outcomes should not be too
1This is stressed, for example, by Kurz (2012, p. 1).
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dierent from the probabilities with which dierent outcomes actually occur, given
that experience should allow some acquaintance with these probabilities, whether
or not people understand how these outcomes are generated. The former approach
supposes that beliefs should be rened through a process of reection, independent
of experience and not necessarily occurring in real time, that Guesnerie (1992) calls
eduction, while the latter supposes that beliefs should be rened over time through a
process of induction from observed outcomes. Section 2 discusses the rst approach,
while examples of the second approach are taken up in sections 3 and 4.
Within the category of inductive approaches, one may distinguish two important
sub-categories. A rst class of approaches species the beliefs that should be regarded
as reasonable by specifying the patterns that people should be able to recognize in the
data on the basis of the rationality of the procedure used to look for such patterns. A
dierent class of approaches species a degree of correspondence between subjective
and model-implied probabilities that should be expected, without explicitly modeling
the process of inference through which such beliefs are formed. The rst class of
approaches (models of econometric learning) is treated in section 3, while the second
class (theories of partially or approximately correct beliefs) is taken up in section 4.
The dierent possible approaches to the specication of expectations are compared
by illustrating the application of each in the context of the same general framework
for macroeconomic analysis, introduced in section 1. In each case, it is shown that
one can demand that the specication of beliefs satisfy quite stringent rationality
requirements without, in general, being able to conclude that the predictions of the
RE equilibrium analysis must obtain. I shall consider in particular the consequences
of alternative specications of expectations for several familiar issues: the conditions
under which an interest-rate rule for monetary policy should be able to maintain a
stable ination rate; the nature of the trade-o between ination stabilization and
output stabilization; and the eects of the government budget on aggregate demand.
1 Temporary Equilibrium in a New Keynesian Model
I begin by introducing a framework for analysis of the determinants of aggregate
output and ination, in which subjective expectations can be specied arbitrarily, in
order to clarify the role of alternative specications of expectations. It allows the
eects of both monetary and scal policies to be considered, along with a variety of
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types of exogenous disturbances to economic \fundamentals" and possible shifts in
expectations. The model is one in which households and rms solve innite-horizon
optimization problems, as in the DSGE models commonly used for quantitative policy
analysis; in fact, under the assumption of rational expectations, the model presented
here corresponds to a textbook New Keynesian model of the kind analyzed in Clarida
et al. (1999), Woodford (2003, chap. 4), Gali (2008, chap. 3), or Walsh (2010, chap.
8). Essentially, the goal of this section is to show how \temporary equilibrium" anal-
ysis of the kind introduced by Hicks (1939) and Lindahl (1939) and further developed
by Grandmont (1977, 1988) | in which a general competitive equilibrium is dened
at each point in time, on the basis of the (independently specied) expectations that
decisionmakers happen to entertain at that time | can be extended to a setting
with monopolistic competition, sticky prices, and innite-horizon planning, for closer
comparison with the conclusions of conventional macroeconomic analysis. Some of
the best-known conclusions from RE analysis of the model are also recalled, as a basis
for comparison with the conclusions from alternative specications of expectations in
the later sections.
1.1 Expectations and Aggregate Demand
The economy is made up of a large number of identical households, and a large
number of rms, each of which is the monopoly producer of a particular dierentiated
good, with each household owning an equal share of each rm.2 At any point in
time, a household has an innite-horizon consumption (and wealth-accumulation)
plan from that date forward, which maximizes expected discounted utility under
certain subjective expectations regarding the future evolution of income and the rate
of return on saving; and the household's expenditure at that date is assumed to be the
one called for by the plan believed to be optimal at that time. (The household may
or may not continue to execute the same plan as time passes, depending on what is
assumed about how expectations change.) While I wish for now to leave the subjective
expectations unspecied, the expectations held at any date represent a well-behaved
probability measure over possible future evolutions of the state variables. Because I
2These and other aspects of the model structure are explained in more detail in Woodford (2003).
Here I focus only on the points at which an alternative model of expectations requires a generalization
of the standard exposition.
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shall not assume that subjective expectations are necessarily model-consistent, they
are not necessarily the same across households; nor shall I necessarily assume that a
household's later expectations are those that it previously expected to hold.
To simplify, I shall assume that the only traded asset is riskless nominal one-
period government debt.3 I shall further assume that households have no choice but
to supply the hours of work that are demanded by rms, at a wage that is xed by
a union that bargains on behalf of the households. A household then has a single
decision each period, which is the amount to spend on consumption. Because its
nonnancial income (the sum of its wage income and its share of the prots of the
rms) is outside its control, in order to analyze optimal expenditure, we need only
specify households' expectations regarding the time path of their total nonnancial
income. If an equal amount of work is demanded from each household at the wage
xed by the union, and households similarly each receive an equal share of the prots
of all of the rms,4 then each household's nonnancial income will be the same each
period, and equal to its share of the total value of output in that period; hence we
can equivalently specify nonnancial income expectations as expectations regarding
the path of output.
A household's perceived intertemporal budget constraint then depends only on its
expectations about the path of aggregate output, the path of aggregate tax collections
(also assumed to be levied equally on each household), and the real return on the
one-period debt. The consumption planning problem for an individual household at
a given point in time is then the familiar one faced by a household with rational
expectations and an exogenously given income process (discussed, for example, in
Deaton, 1992), and the solution is correspondingly the same, except with subjective
probabilities substituted for objective ones.5
3In many RE analyses, with a representative household and scal policy assumed to be Ricardian
(in the sense dened in Woodford, 2001), the model dynamics are unaected by allowing additional
nancial markets or even issuance of other types of government debt. The restriction to one-
period debt is no longer innocuous, however, once one allows for more general hypotheses regarding
expectations, as shown for example in Eusepi and Preston (2012b). Nonetheless, I here consider
only the most simple case.
4Equity ownership shares are assumed for simplicity to be non-tradeable.
5Note that the log-linear theory of aggregate demand derived here is the same as in a model
where households are assumed simply to have an exogenous endowment of the consumption good,
like that of Guesnerie (2008).
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I shall log-linearize this and other structural relations of the model around a deter-
ministic steady state, in which (i) all exogenous state variables are forever constant,
(ii) monetary and scal policy are specied to maintain a constant zero rate of ina-
tion and some constant positive level of public debt, and (iii) all subjective expecta-
tions are correct (i.e., households and rms have perfect foresight). The log-linearized
relations accordingly represent an approximation to the exact model, applying in the
case that exogenous disturbances are suciently small, monetary and scal policies
are suciently close to being consistent with this steady state, and expectational
errors are suciently small.
A log-linear approximation to the consumption function takes the form
cit = (1  )bit +
1X
T=t
T tE^it f(1  )(YT   T )  (iT   T+1)
+(1  )sb(iT   T )  (cT+1   cT )g : (1.1)
Here cit is total real expenditure by household i (on all of the dierentiated goods)
in period t, measured as a deviation from the steady-state level of consumption, and
expressed as a fraction of steady-state output; bit is the value of maturing bonds carried
into period t by household i, deated by the period t  1 price level (rather than the
period t price level) so that this wealth measure is predetermined at date t   1;6 Yt
is the deviation of aggregate output from its steady-state value, as a fraction of that
steady-state value;  t is net tax collections, also measured as a deviation from the
steady-state level of tax revenues and expressed as a fraction of steady-state output;
it is the riskless one-period nominal interest rate on debt issued in period t; t is
the ination rate between periods t   1 and t; and ct is an exogenous shock to the
utility from consumption in period t. In addition, 0 <  < 1 is the utility discount
factor,  > 0 measures the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and sb > 0 is the
steady-state level of government debt, expressed as a fraction of steady-state output.
The notation E^itfg indicates the expected value of the terms in the brackets,
under the subjective expectations of household i in period t. The bit and YT T terms
then represent (a subjective version of) the usual permanent-income hypothesis;7 the
6The reduction in the real value of this wealth due to ination between periods t   1 and t is
then reected in the  sbt term inside the curly brackets.
7See, e.g., Deaton (1992) for an exposition of the standard theory, under the assumptions of
rational expectations, no preference shocks, and a constant real interest rate.
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(iT   T+1) terms indicate how expectations of a real interest rate dierent from
the rate of time preference shift the desired time path of spending; the sb(iT   T )
terms indicate the income eects of variations in nominal interest rates and ination;
and the cT terms indicate the eects of preference shocks on the desired time path of
spending.
Equation (1.1) involves subjective expectations of a number of variables at many
future horizons, but under our linear approximation we can write desired expenditure
as a function of the household's forecast of a single variable,
cit = (1 )bit+(1 )(Yt  t) [ (1 )sb]it (1 )sbt+ct+E^itvit+1; (1.2)




T tE^it f(1  )(YT   T )  [   (1  )sb](iT   T )  (1  )cTg : (1.3)
The advantage of this notation is that we need only to specify how people forecast a
single variable each period; note however that the variable that people must forecast
is a subjective state variable, that will depend on their own future forecasts.
Aggregate demand is then given by Yt =
R
citdi+Gt; where Gt is the departure of
government purchases of the composite good from their steady-state level, also mea-
sured as a fraction of steady-state output. Substituting (1.2) for cit in this expression,
we obtain
Yt = gt + (1  )bt + vt   t; (1.4)
where gt  Gt + ct is a composite exogenous disturbance to \autonomous expen-
diture",8 bt 
R
bitdi is the aggregate supply of public debt, and vt 
R
vitdi is the
average value of the expectational variable dened in (1.3). We thus obtain an equa-
tion for aggregate demand that separates out the eects of the exogenous disturbances
gt; the wealth eect of public debt, and the average state of expectation captured by
vt.
The government's ow budget constraint implies a law of motion
bt+1 = 
 1 [bt   sbt   st] + sbit (1.5)
8To simplify, I treat government purchases as an exogenous disturbance, rather than as a possibly
endogenous policy choice.
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for the public debt, where st   t   Gt is the real primary budget surplus in period
t, measured as a deviation from its steady-state level and expressed as a fraction of
steady-state output. The aggregate demand block of our model then consists of equa-
tions (1.4) and (1.5), together with monetary and scal policy equations that specify
the evolution of it and st respectively (generally as a function of other endogenous
variables), and a specication of the evolution of the forecasts fE^itvit+1g (which de-
termine the expectational variable vt). We then have a system of four equations per
period (plus the specication of expectations) to determine the paths fYt; bt; it; stg
given a path for the price level, or the paths ft; bt; it; stg given a supply-determined
path for output, along with the composite disturbance gt and shocks to policy and
expectations.
Denition (1.3) has a recursive form, so that the only subjective expectations
involved in vit are i's forecast of the corresponding variable one period in the future.
Specically, (1.3) implies that
vit = (1  )vt + (1  )(bt+1   bt)  (it   t) + E^itvit+1; (1.6)
where in addition to substituting the forecast of vit+1 for the expectational terms,
I have used (1.4) to substitute out Yt and (1.5) to substitute out  t. Hence to
specify the aspects of subjective expectations that are relevant for aggregate demand
determination it suces that we specify an evolution for the fvitg, and subjective one-
period-ahead forecasts of those variables, that are consistent with (1.6). This result is
used below to characterize the possible temporary equilibrium (TE) dynamics, under
various more specic assumptions about expectations.
1.2 Ricardian Expectations





T t[sT   sb(iT   T )]:
I shall say that households have Ricardian expectations if they expect that the path




T t[sT   sb(iT   T )] = bt (1.7)
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at all times. It is not obvious that expectations must have this property, even under
the RE hypothesis;9 it is even less obvious that reasonable expectations must have
this property once one dispenses with the strict RE assumption. Nonetheless, this
property is frequently assumed (at least tacitly) in non-RE analyses, and I shall
mainly assume it in the discussion below, to simplify the analysis.10
Under this assumption, there is no longer a wealth eect of variation in the public
debt; the bt term in (1.4) is exactly canceled by the eects of the change in the
expected path of primary surpluses on the vt term. In fact, one can write (1.4) more
simply as
Yt = gt + vt   t; (1.8)
where vt  vt+(1 )bt is the average value of a subjective variable vit which (under




T tE^it f(1  )(YT   gT )  (iT   T )g : (1.9)
In this case, aggregate demand determination is completely independent of the paths
of both public debt and tax collections | so that \Ricardian equivalence" obtains
| as long as these scal variables have no direct eect on people's expectations
regarding the evolution of the variables fYt; t; it; gtg; or more simply, as long they
have no direct eect on forecasts of the path of the variables fvitg.11
Under the assumption of Ricardian expectations, it is convenient to specify ex-
pectations by describing the evolution of the variables fvitg; these must be consistent
9It is possible for people to believe in a scal rule without this property, and yet for a RE
equilibrium to exist, as shown for example in Woodford (2001). (In equilibrium, debt does not
explode, and expectations are correct; but people believe that debt would explode in the case of
certain paths for endogenous variables that do not occur in equilibrium.) Some have disputed
whether such a specication of out-of-equilibrium beliefs should be considered to be consistent with
the RE hypothesis; see Bassetto (2002) for a careful discussion.
10In many NK models with adaptive learning, TE relations are derived by simply inserting subjec-
tive expectations into equations that hold (in terms of model-consistent conditional expectations) in
the RE version of the model; the fact that government liabilities are not perceived to be net wealth
in the RE analysis then leads to an assumption that they are not in the learning analysis, without
any discussion of the assumption. Evans and Honkapohja (2010) instead make the assumption of
Ricardian expectations explicit. Eusepi and Preston (2012a, 2012b) and Benhabib et al. (2012)
provide examples of analyses in which Ricardian expectations are not assumed.
11See Evans et al. (2012) for a more detailed discussion of the conditions under which Ricardian
equivalence obtains even without the RE hypothesis.
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with a relation of the form
vit = (1  )vt   (it   t) + E^itvit+1; (1.10)
analogous to (1.6). The complete aggregate demand block of the model then consists
of equation (1.8), a monetary policy equation, and a specication of the evolution
of the expectational variable fvitg consistent with (1.10). This system provides two
equations per period to determine the paths of fYt; itg given the evolution of the price
level, the exogenous disturbances fgtg, and shocks to policy and expectations.
1.3 Expectations and Aggregate Supply
Each of the monopolistically competitive rms sets the price for the particular good
that it alone produces. Prices are assumed to remain xed for a random interval
of time: each period, fraction 0 <  < 1 of all goods prices remain the same (in
monetary terms) as in the previous period, while the other prices are reconsidered;
and the probability that any given price is reconsidered in any period is assumed to
be independent of both the current price and the length of time that the price has
remained xed. It then follows that (again in a log-linear approximation) the rate of
ination t between periods t  1 and t will be given by
t = (1  )pt ; (1.11)
where for each rm j, pjt is the amount by which the rm would choose to set the log
price of its good higher than pt 1; the log of the general price index in period t  1,
were it to be one of the rms that reconsiders its price in period t; and pt 
R
pjt dj
is the average value of this quantity across all rms.
Each rm that reconsiders its price in a given period chooses the new price that
it believes will maximize the present value of its prots from that period onward.
In a Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, with a single economy-wide
labor market, prots in any period are the same function of a rm's own price and
of aggregate market conditions for each rm. The single-period prot-maximizing
log price poptt is then the same for each rm, and a log-linear approximation to the
rst-order condition for optimal price-setting takes the form





T   pt 1; (1.12)
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where  is again the utility discount factor (also the rate at which real prots are
discounted in steady state), and E^jt [] indicates a conditional expectation with respect
to the subjective beliefs of rm j at date t. The recursive form of (1.12) implies that
internally consistent expectations on the part of any rm must satisfy
pjt = (1  )(poptt   pt 1) + (E^jt pjt+1 + t): (1.13)
Averaging this expression over rms j and using the resulting equation to substitute
for pt in (1.11), we see that ination determination depends only on the average of
rms' subjective forecasts of a single variable, namely each rm's own value for the
expectational variable pjT one period in the future.
Suppose furthermore that the union sets a wage each period with the property
that at that wage, a marginal increase in labor demand would neither increase nor de-
crease average perceived utility across households, if for each household the marginal
utility of the additional wage income is weighed against the marginal disutility of the
additional work. This implies that (in a log-linear approximation)
wt = t   t;
where wt is the log real wage, t is the log of the (common) marginal disutility of labor,
and t is the average across households of 
i
t; a household's subjective assessment of
its marginal utility of additional real income. Since optimizing consumption demand
implies that
it =   1(cit   ct);
we obtain
wt = t + 
 1(ct   ct) = t +  1(Yt   gt);
just as in a representative-household model with RE and a competitive economy-wide
labor market. In a model in which labor is the only variable factor of production,
both t and the marginal product of labor can be expressed as functions of hours
worked and hence as functions of output Yt and the exogenous level of productivity
in period t. We then obtain a relation of the form
poptt = pt + (Yt   Y nt ) + t; (1.14)
where yt indicates the \output gap" (dened as Yt  Y nt , where the \natural rate" of
output Y nt is a composite exogenous disturbance, involving variations in gt, produc-
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tivity, and shocks to the disutility of labor), and t measures exogenous variations in
the desired markup of prices over marginal cost.12
Substituting (1.11) for t and (1.14) for p
opt
t in (1.13), we obtain
pjt = (1  )pt + (1  ) [yt + t] + E^jt pjt+1: (1.15)
In order for beliefs to be internally consistent, the evolution of the expectational
variables fpjt g and subjective one-period-ahead forecasts of those variables must
satisfy (1.15) at all times. Given such beliefs, the ination rate will be determined by
(1.11). Thus equations (1.11) and (1.15) constitute the aggregate-supply block of the
model, which determines the evolution of the general price level, given the evolution
of output, exogenous disturbances, and expectations.
1.4 The Complete Model
In the complete TE system, then, the expectations that must be specied are paths
for fvitg for all households and fpjt g for all rms, consistent with relations (1.10) and
(1.15) respectively. Given these expectations, paths for the exogenous disturbances
fgt; Y nt ; tg, and a monetary policy rule for the evolution of fitg, the evolution of
aggregate output and ination are then given by equations (1.8) and (1.11).
Substituting for the variables vit and p
j
t in terms of current observables and fore-
casts of future conditions, (1.8) can be written as





and (1.11) can correspondingly be written as






  (1  )(1  )

 > 0; ut  (1  )(1  )

t:
We thus obtain an \IS equation" and \AS equation" to describe short-run output
and ination determination, given monetary policy, exogenous disturbances, and ex-
pectations.
12The separation of the eects of exogenous disturbances into Y nt and t components in (1.14) is
useful only in the case that stabilization of the output gap is a goal of policy.
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If expectations are assumed not to change in response to policy changes or other
shocks, the model makes predictions like those of a standard undergraduate textbook
exposition. For example, an increase in the central bank's interest-rate target it should
reduce output and ination. An increase in government purchases (that increases gt,
and also increases Y nt by a smaller amount) should increase both output and ination.
And a \cost-push shock" ut > 0 should increase ination, but have no eect on output
if the central bank's interest-rate target is unchanged; if it is instead raised in response
to the increase in ination, output should fall and the ination increase will be more
modest.
But the model also indicates the eects on output and ination of changes in
average expectations. For example, an increase in the average forecast by rms of
the log price that they would wish to choose if reviewing their price one period in
the future, relative to the current average price, should raise current ination for any
current level of output, just as in the case of an exogenous cost-push shock. And there
is no general reason to suppose that expectations should be unaected by shocks of
the kind considered in the previous paragraph; hence a complete analysis even of
short-run equilibrium requires a specication of how expectations are determined.
If expectations are Ricardian and monetary policy is unaected by scal vari-
ables, the model implies that neither the size of the public debt nor the government
budget matter for output and ination determination. If instead expectations are
not assumed to be Ricardian, it is more convenient to write the model in terms of
expectations of vit+1 rather than v
i
t+1: The \IS equation" can then alternatively be
written in the form





where one should recall from (1.5) that bt+1 is known at date t (though the debt
matures at t+ 1). In this case, since the endogenous public debt matters for output
and ination determination, we must adjoin (1.5) to the system that describes TE
dynamics under a given specication of ination.
The complete TE dynamics for the endogenous variables ft; Yt; bt+1g are then
given in the non-Ricardian case by the system consisting of (1.5), (1.17) and (1.18),
given expectations fvit; pjt g consistent with (1.6) and (1.15). One observes that a
larger budget decit (or smaller surplus) should increase output and ination, to the
extent that it does not cause a reduction in the nal expectational term in (1.18), of
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a magnitude as large as the increase in (1  )bt+1:
1.5 RE Equilibrium
Thus far, I have been completely agnostic about the nature of subjective forecasts.
Under the RE hypothesis, all agents' probability beliefs are identical, and coincide
with the probabilities predicted by one's model, given the choices that people make
on the basis of those beliefs. Under the hypothesis that all beliefs are identical, we
can replace the operators fE^i[]g and fE^j[]g by the single expectation operator E^[]:




t for all j, equations (1.10) and
(1.15) reduce to
vt =  (it   t) + E^tvt+1; (1.19)
pt = (1  ) 1 [yt + ut] + E^tpt+1 (1.20)
respectively. If we assume a monetary policy rule (or central-bank reaction function)
of the form13
it = t + yyt + 
i
t; (1.21)
where it is an exogenous disturbance to monetary policy, and use equations (1.8),
(1.11), and (1.21) to substitute for it; t and yt in equations (1.19){(1.20), we obtain
a system that can be written in the form
zt = B E^tzt+1 + bt; (1.22)
where zt is the vector of endogenous variables (vt; p

t ); t is the vector of (composite)
exogenous disturbances (gt   Y nt ; ut; it), and B and b are matrices of coecients.
If subjective probabilities must coincide with objective probabilities, we can re-
place (1.22) by
zt = B Etzt+1 + bt; (1.23)
where Et[] denotes an expectational conditional on the state of the world at date t,
under the probability distribution over future paths that represents the equilibrium
outcome. An RE equilibrium (REE) is then a stochastic process fztg consistent with
13This version of the \Taylor rule" (Taylor, 1993) reects an implicit ination target of zero. In
particular, if all exogenous disturbances are zero forever, this policy is consistent with the steady
state around which the model equations have been log-linearized.
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(1.23). (Note that any solution for the process fztg completely determines the stochas-
tic evolution of the variables ft; Yt; itg, using equations (1.8), (1.11), and (1.21).) We
shall here restrict attention only to the possibility of bounded solutions fztg, on the
assumption that the disturbances ftg are bounded, since our log-linearized equations
are derived under this assumption.
The RE hypothesis does not necessarily determine a unique set of model-consistent
probability beliefs; because it is a consistency criterion, rather than a hypothesis
about how beliefs are formed, it essentially denes a xed-point problem. RE beliefs
are a xed point of the mapping from possible subjective probabilities into the implied
objective probabilities; see Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for further discussion of this
\T-mapping." Such a xed-point problem may or may not have a solution, and the
solution may or may not be unique. In the case of a linear system such as (1.23),
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) establish that the existence and uniqueness of bounded
solutions depend on the eigenvalues of the matrix B. Because no elements of zt are
predetermined, RE equilibrium is determinate (a unique bounded RE solution exists)
if and only if both eigenvalues of B lie inside the unit circle. Under the assumption
that the response coecients in (1.21) satisfy ; y  0; one can show (Woodford,





y > 1; (1.24)
sometimes called the \Taylor Principle."14 If monetary policy satises (1.24), (1.23)
can be \solved forward" for zt as a linear function of current and expected future
values of the exogenous disturbances; in the case that the exogenous disturbances
follow linear-Markovian dynamics, so that Ett+1 = t for some stable matrix ,
this solution is given by
zt = Z t; (1.25)
14See Proposition 4.3 in Woodford (2003, chap. 4). Woodford analyzes a system of the form
(1.23) but in which the vector zt has ination and the output gap as elements. But since this vector
is a non-singular linear transformation of the vector zt used here (plus an exogenous term, which
does not aect the determinacy calculation), the eigenvalues of the matrix B in Woodford (2003)







The implied responses of ination, output and interest rates to exogenous distur-
bances of various kinds are discussed further in Woodford (2003, chap. 4) and Gali
(2008, chap. 3).
If instead (1.24) is not satised, there are an innite number of REE (even re-
stricting our attention to bounded solutions), including solutions in which ination
and output uctuate in response to \sunspots" (random events with no consequences
for the economic fundamentals t) or in which the uctuations in ination and output
are arbitrarily large relative to the magnitude of the exogenous disturbances. In the
case of such a policy, the economy may be vulnerable to instability due purely to the
volatility of expectations, even under the assumption that the economy must evolve
in accordance with an REE. Because instability of this kind is undesirable, it is often
argued that a policy commitment should be chosen that ensures the existence of a
determinate RE equilibrium (see, e.g.,Woodford, 2003, chaps. 2, 4); in the context of
New Keynesian models of the kind sketched here, this provides an argument for the
desirability of an interest-rate rule that conforms to the Taylor Principle (see, e.g.,
Clarida, et al., 2000).16 Apart from the use of the determinacy result as a criterion
for the choice of a monetary policy rule, the predicted character of the uctuations
due to self-fullling expectations when the Taylor Principle is not satised has been
proposed by some as a positive theory of the aggregate uctuations observed during
periods when monetary policy has arguably been relatively \passive" (e.g., Clarida
et al., 2000; Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004). As discussed below, however, relaxation
of the RE hypothesis opens up additional possibilities for instability under regimes
that fail to pin down expectations suciently precisely.
Some argue that avoidance of indeterminacy of REE need not be a concern when
15Note that this innite sum must converge, because we have assumed that both B and  have
all eigenvalues inside the unit circle.
16Some object to this argument for the Taylor Principle on the ground that it ensures only a locally
unique REE | there is only one equilibrium in which the endogenous variables remain forever near
the target steady state | but does not exclude the possibility of other REE, including sunspot
equilibria, that do not remain near the steady state (e.g., Benhabib et al., 2001). This is issue is
beyond the scope of the current review, owing to our reliance on a local log-linear characterization
of equilibrium dynamics; but see Woodford (2003, chap. 2, sec. 4) for further discussion.
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choosing a monetary policy rule, on the ground that even in the indeterminate case,
there is no reason to expect people's expectations to coordinate on a sunspot equilib-
rium, or even on one with excessive uctuations in response to fundamental distur-
bances (e.g.,McCallum, 1983). Such authors argue that a model's positive prediction
should be based on some further renement of the set of equilibria, such as a restric-
tion to Markovian equilibria, in which endogenous variables depend only on those
aspects of the state of the world that aect either the equilibrium relations that de-
termine those variables, or the conditional probabilities of states that will be relevant
for equilibrium determination in the future.17
If ftg is Markovian in the above example, this would mean restricting attention
to REE of the form (1.25), for some matrix Z. Since (1.25) represents an REE if and
only if the matrix Z satises
Z = BZ + b;
and these are a system of 6 linear equations for the 6 elements of Z, there is a
unique solution of this form for generic parameter values, even when the monetary
policy rule fails to satisfy (1.24). (McCallum, 1983, calls this the \minimum-state-
variable solution.") But the question whether, or under what circumstances, we
should expect people to coordinate on the particular expectations specied by the
Markovian solution is a question that cannot be answered by the RE hypothesis
itself; and the consideration of plausible restrictions on expectations that do not
simply assume RE can be of help in justifying a particular selection from among the
set of REE, as proposed by McCallum.
2 Rationalizable TE Dynamics
As discussed in the introduction, one broad approach to the formulation of a criterion
for reasonableness of beliefs | without simply postulating an exact correspondence
between people's forecasts and those that are correct (according to one's model of
the economy) | is to assume that people should correctly understand the economic
model, and be able to form correct inferences from it about possible future outcomes.
This approach supposes that beliefs should be rened through a process of reection,
17This renement is closely related to the idea of restricting attention to the Markov perfect
equilibria of dynamic games (Maskin and Tirole, 2001).
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independent of experience and not necessarily occurring in real time, that Gues-
nerie (1992) calls eduction. While RE beliefs would certainly withstand a process of
scrutiny of this kind, such beliefs need not be the only ones that could be rationalized
in this way.
2.1 \Eductive Stability" Analysis
For the sake of concreteness, let us consider the case of Ricardian expectations and
monetary policy specied by (1.21). The assumption that people in the economy \un-
derstand the model" means, in the present context, that people understand that the
TE dynamics of ination, output and interest rates will be determined by equations
(1.16), (1.17) and (1.21) each period, given the average one-period-ahead forecasts of
others. In order for someone's expectations regarding the paths of the endogenous
variables to be consistent with this knowledge, the expected paths must be able to be
generated by these equations, under some supposition about the average expectations
of others.
Let a possible conjecture about the evolution of average one-period-ahead forecasts
be specied by a vector stochastic process e  fetg, where at any date the two








t+1dj: For any such evolution of average
forecasts, the structural equations determine unique TE processes ft; Yt; itg. Hence
any agent (household or rm) that expects average expectations to evolve in the future
in accordance with the process e, and that understands the model, must (in order to
have internally consistent beliefs) forecast precisely this particular evolution of the
variables ft; Yt; itg. There is then a unique internally consistent anticipated evolution
of this agent's own one-period-ahead forecasts fE^itvit+1g (in the case of a household),
implied by (1.10), and similarly a unique internally consistent anticipated evolution
fE^jt pjt+1g (in the case of a rm), implied by (1.15). This allows us to determine a
new vector stochastic process e0  fe0tg that describes the one-period-ahead forecasts
that must be made by agents who understand the model and believe that the average
forecasts of others will evolve according to e.
Let 	 denote the mapping that determines e0 = 	(e) in the way just described.
Then individual beliefs ei are consistent with knowledge of the model only if there
exists some specication of average beliefs e such that ei = 	(e): In this case we can
say that the beliefs ei can be rationalized by the conjecture e about average beliefs.
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Because of the linearity of the mapping 	; it is evident that if all agents understand
the model, a specication of average beliefs e is rationalizable if and only if there exists
some conjecture about average beliefs e1 such that e = 	(e1): But if in addition all
agents understand that all agents understand the model, their conjectures about
average beliefs are consistent with this knowledge only if e1 can itself be similarly
rationalized, which is to say, if there exists a conjecture e2 such that e1 = 	(e2): Any
number of levels of rationalization might be demanded in a similar way.
Even if we assume that agents' forecasts should be grounded in reasoning of this
kind, it may be reasonable only to demand some nite number of levels of rationaliza-
tion, either because it is only assumed that people understand that others understand
... that others understand the model, to some nite order of recursion; or because it
is not considered practical for agents to check their beliefs for this degree of internal
consistency beyond some nite number of levels.18 In this case, kth-order beliefs (for
some nite k) are allowed to be specied arbitrarily (required to be internally con-
sistent, but not necessarily consistent with understanding the model). In this case,
obtaining denite conclusions requires a specic theory of kth-order beliefs (perhaps
some fairly simple specication), or at least some bounds on the class of possible
specications of kth-order beliefs that may be entertained.
Alternatively, one may, as in the literature on \rationalizable equilibria" in game
theory (Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984), require that beliefs be consistent with an
innite hierarchy of beliefs, each level of which is rationalized by the next higher
level of beliefs. RE beliefs represent one possible type of rationalizable beliefs in this
sense; but not all rationalizable beliefs need be RE beliefs, and even when REE is
determinate, there may be a large multiplicity of rationalizable beliefs, even under the
requirement that beliefs satisfy some uniform bound at all levels. Guesnerie (1992,
2005) calls an investigation of whether the REE beliefs are the unique rationalizable
beliefs \eductive stability analysis." If the REE is eductively stable, he considers
the REE outcome to be a reasonable prediction of one's model; but if not, the other
rationalizable paths are taken to be equally plausible predictions.
The existence of a large set of possible equilibrium outcomes, including the possi-
bility of uctuations in response to sunspots, or large uctuations in response to small
18See, e.g., Phelps (1983) or Evans and Ramey (1992) for proposals of this kind. Evans and
Ramey propose to endogenize the number of levels of rationalization in terms of \calculation costs"
involved in iterating the mapping 	 another time.
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changes in fundamentals, is regarded as an undesirable form of instability. Hence
Guesnerie proposes as a criterion for policy choice the desirability of nding a policy
under which the REE is eductively stable.19 This is in the spirit of the proposal,
discussed above, that policy be designed to ensure determinacy of RE equilibrium,
but is an even stronger requirement, since uniqueness of rationalizable equilibrium
necessarily implies determinacy of REE, while the converse is not true.
2.2 The Taylor Principle and Determinacy Reconsidered
As an illustration, let us consider whether a monetary policy rule of the form (1.21)
ensures unique (uniformly bounded) rationalizable dynamics. To simplify, as in Gues-
nerie (2008), let us consider the limiting case of perfectly exible prices. In this limit,
output Yt is determined by exogenous fundamentals, and (1.16) and (1.21) jointly
determine it and t given expectations and exogenous fundamentals. Calculations
are also simplied if there are assumed to be no exogenous disturbances (including
no variation in Yt), as the issue of the multiplicity of solutions is unaected by the
amplitude of disturbances. Hence the monetary policy rule (1.21) reduces simply to
it = t: REE is determinate if and only if  > 1:
20 When this condition is satised,
the unique bounded REE has vt = 0 for all t, implying that it = t = 0 for all t.
While  > 1 is therefore also a necessary condition for uniqueness of the ratio-
nalizable dynamics, it is not sucient. Guesnerie (2008) shows that if 1=2 <  < 1
and
 > (2   1) 1 > 1; (2.1)
then even though REE is determinate, there is a large multiplicity of uniformly
bounded rationalizable equilibria. For example, consider the hierarchy of beliefs that
may support a rationalizable TE at some date t. The requirement of rationalizability
does not establish any necessary linkages between what happens at dierent dates:
only between what happens at date t and what people expect at date t that people
will expect at later dates about what people will expect ... will happen at still later
dates. Thus for each date t we may separately specify what happens at that date,
along with the hierarchy of forecasts of forecasts that rationalize it.
19Since the REE is necessarily a rationalizable equilibrium, uniqueness of rationalizable equilib-
rium requires that the REE be the only such equilibrium.
20This is the implication of (1.24) in the limit in which !1:
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Substituting the policy rule for it in (1.10), and then using (1.8) to eliminate t;
we obtain the requirement that
vit = (1  )vt + E^itvit+1 (2.2)
for all i. In a rationalizable TE, not only must this hold at date t, but everyone must
expect anyone else to expect anyone else ... to expect it to hold at any future date.
One such specication of the hierarchy of beliefs is given by vit = ; and
E^i1t E^
i2
t1    E^int+jn 1vint+jn = ( )1 n;
E^i1t E^
i2
t1    E^int+jn 1vin+1t+jn = ( ) n
for any sequences of households and dates of the kind assumed above, where  is an
arbitrary real number and
     1
(1  )
:
These beliefs satisfy all of the requirements for rationalizability for any real number
; as discussed further in the Appendix (available online). If (2.1) is satised,  > 1,
and forecasts of all orders also satisfy a uniform bound. There is thus (at least) a
continuum of uniformly bounded rationalizable TE. Moreover,  may represent the
realization of a \sunspot" event unrelated to fundamentals, so that there are seen to
exist bounded sunspot equilibria, despite the fact that monetary policy satises the
Taylor Principle.
If instead
1 <  < (2   1) 1; (2.3)
one can show that the determinate REE is also the only uniformly bounded rational-








Hence if it is common knowledge that there exists some nite bound  such that
jvitj   for all i and t, it follows from (2.4) that it must also be common knowledge
that jvtj   1  for all t. Using this bound, (2.2) then implies that
jvitj  j1  j 1 +  = ;
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where
0 <   maxf 1 ; 2    1 g < 1:
Hence common knowledge that jvitj   implies that it must be common knowledge
that jvitj  : By the same reasoning, it must then be common knowledge that
jvitj  2; and so on, until a bound smaller than any positive quantity is established.
Thus it must be common knowledge that vit = 0 for all i and all t, and hence that
it = t = 0 for all t.
In such a case, Guesnerie says that the REE is \eductively stable," and argues
that there is reason (in this case, and this case only) to expect this equilibrium
to obtain. While this is possible, the restrictions on the coecient  are much
more stringent than those required for determinacy under the RE hypothesis. If,
for example,  = 0:99 (a common calibration for quarterly New Keynesian models),
(2.3) requires that 1 <  < 1:02: This very tight bound is violated by the rule
recommended by Taylor (1993), as well as by most estimated central-bank reaction
functions.
If the avoidance of instability due to self-fullling expectations of this particular
type is a design criterion for monetary policy, it follows that one must be careful
about seeking to stabilize ination in the face of real disturbances simply by using a
rule of the form (1.21) with a very strong ination response coecient. Instead, the
simultaneous achievement of eductive stability and stable ination despite exogenous
disturbances is possible only in the case of a policy rule that directly responds to
the underlying determinants of ination, namely, the exogenous disturbances and
observed subjective forecasts.
3 Learning Dynamics
An alternative way of disciplining the specication of expectations does not demand
that they be consistent with a correct structural model of the variables that are
forecasted, but instead requires that the probabilities assigned to possible future
outcomes are not too dierent from the probabilities with which outcomes actually
occur. The idea is that it is not reasonable to suppose that people should fail to
notice predictable regularities in economic data, whether or not they understand why
those regularities exist.
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But which regularities are the ones that one can reasonably expect people to take
into account? A common answer assumes that forecasts should be derived through
extrapolation from prior observations. Such approaches, based on explicit models
of learning, have the advantage of explaining how the postulated similarity between
subjective beliefs and actual patterns in the data comes about. They also reduce
the problem of indeterminacy of the model's predictions, pervasive in the case of
approaches like those discussed thus far, which demand only that beliefs be a xed
point of a certain mapping. While there may be many possible asymptotic states of
belief under an explicit model of learning, with the one that is reached depending
on initial conditions and/or random events along the way, a model of learning often
makes a unique prediction conditional upon initial conditions and the subsequent
history of shocks.
The most common approach of this general type assumes that agents' forecasts at
any time t are derived from an econometric model, estimated using the data observed
up until that date.21 Let the model be specied by a vector  of parameters, and
suppose that any model  implies that forecasts et should be some function of the
current state t. Then in any period t, new estimates ^t and ^t are formed of the
parameters and of the state, based on the data available at that point. Under a
recursive estimation scheme, the new estimates are functions of the prior estimates
and of the new data observed since the formation of the prior estimates,
^t = t(^t 1; t 1; xt); (3.1)
^t = Zt(^t 1; ^t 1; xt) (3.2)
where xt is some vector of new data.
22 Given these new estimates, period t forecasts
are given by a function23
et = 	(^t; ^t): (3.3)
21See Evans and Honkapohja (2001, 2009) and Sargent (2008) for reviews of work of this kind.
22The time subscripts on the functions t() and Zt() allow for the possibility that the updating
rules may depend on the size of the existing dataset. Equation (3.15) below for the evolution of the
mean estimates provides a simple example.
23Here, for simplicity, I assume that every household i and every rm j forecasts in the same way,
using the same observed data, so that average forecasts are simply the common forecasts, given by
a function of the common estimates. One may, however, allow each household and to have its own
estimated model ^
i
t; evolving according to a separate equation of the form (3.1), and then deneR
E^itv
i
t+1di as a function of the entire probability distribution of estimates f^
i
tg, rather than simply
as a function of a single estimate ^t; and similarly with the rms.
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Given these beliefs, the TE values of the variables zt are determined by (1.22), given
the exogenous disturbances t. This system, possibly along with additional structural
equations, determines the new data xt.
24 Thus the system of equations (1.22) and
(3.1){(3.3) jointly determines ^t; ^t; et; and xt, given the lagged estimates and the
disturbances t: Solution of these equations in each of a succession of periods yields
the predicted dynamics of both beliefs and endogenous variables, as a function of the
history of exogenous disturbances.
3.1 Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium
A focus of much of the literature on TE dynamics with learning has been to ask
whether learning dynamics should converge asymptotically to REE; indeed, much
of the early literature (beginning with Bray, 1982) was concerned more with the
foundations of the REE concept | seeking to provide a causal explanation for how
the postulated coincidence between subjective and objective probabilities could come
about | than with the provision of an alternative model of economic dynamics.
Obviously this is only possible if the class of forecasting models that are contemplated
includes a model RE that produces the forecasts associated with the REE. If one
does not assume that economic agents are endowed with knowledge of the structural
model, and hence with the information required to compute the REE, it is not obvious
that their forecasting approach should even entertain as a possibility the precise
forecasting rule implied by the REE; but if no value of  results in forecasts of this
kind, convergence to REE beliefs (and hence to the REE dynamics) is obviously
impossible.
There might, however, still be convergence of beliefs to some xed point  with
the property that under the TE dynamics generated by the beliefs ;  is the model
(among the class of models considered) that yields the best forecasts (under some
24It is common in the literature on learning dynamics to specify a recursive causal structure by
assuming that the data xt are actually determined in period t   1 (i.e., they include t 1 rather
than t; and so on). In this case, all of the arguments of the functions in (3.1){(3.2) are predeter-
mined, so that these equations determine the new estimates (^t; ^t) independently of the period-t
shocks; equation (3.3) then determines the forecasts et; and nally equations (1.22) determine the
endogenous variables zt given the shocks. But it is not obvious why, in the logic of the NK model
presented here, one should suppose that period t forecasts must be made prior to the observation of
period t endogenous variables.
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criterion that is used for the estimation). For example, suppose that the class of
models considered consists of those in which both vt+1 and p

t+1 are linear functions
of t and unforecastable disturbances at t + 1; that the elements of t are all part
of the history of the observables fxt; xt 1; : : :g; so that t is observable; and that the
coecients of the linear model are estimated so as to minimize the mean squared
error of the forecasts of vt+1 and p

t+1: Then forecasts will be of the form et = ^
0
t;
where the vector t is assumed to include an element equal to 1 each period; and
with an innite sequence of data generated by the TE dynamics under beliefs , the









where E[] indicates an unconditional expectation under the ergodic TE dynamics
resulting from some beliefs . Alternatively, we can write et = Pt[zt+1], where Pt[]
denotes the linear projection of the random variable inside the brackets on the space
spanned by the elements of t:
The beliefs  constitute a restricted perceptions equilibrium (RPE) if the optimal
estimate ^ given by (3.4) is equal to  when the unconditional expectations are the
ones implied by the TE dynamics generated by beliefs  =  (Evans and Honkapohja,
2001, chap. 13; Branch, 2004). This is a weaker requirement than that of an REE, as
forecasts are assumed to be optimal only within a particular class of linear models,
rather than within the class of all forecasts that might be made on the basis of
information available in period t. Note that in the special case that the optimal
forecast of zt+1 is indeed a linear function of t; so that
Et[zt+1] = Pt[zt+1] = T ()
0t (3.5)
when the TE dynamics are generated by beliefs ; then (3.4) implies that ^ = T ():
Hence in this case,  describes RPE beliefs if and only if T () = ; which is also the
condition for REE beliefs. More generally, however, when the forecasting variables
t do not span a large enough space, or at any rate not the correct one, RPE beliefs
will dier from REE beliefs.
Conditions can be established under which the learning dynamics resulting from
repeated re-estimation of an OLS forecasting equation (least-squares learning dynam-
ics) converge with probability 1 to an RPE as the length of the observed data set
grows large enough. But even in such a case, the dynamics need not coincide, even
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asymptotically, with the model's REE dynamics. Fuster et al. (2010, 2011, 2012)
provide examples in which more complex dynamics of asset prices, consumption and
investment are implied by RPE dynamics than would be associated with REE dynam-
ics of the same models; here the suboptimality of forecasts results from estimation of
lower-order autoregressive models of the data than the correct model.
3.1.1 Application to the NK Model
Suppose that we equate the subjective expectations in (1.22) with linear projections,
to obtain
zt = BPtzt+1 + bt: (3.6)
This is the set of conditions that must be satised in order for the evolution of the
expectational variables fztg to represent an RPE, under either of two possible inter-
pretations of how forecasts for horizons more than period in the future are formed.
On the one hand, we might assume, as Preston (2005) does, that forecasts for
arbitrary future horizons are formed by estimating a vector-autoregressive system
Ptxt+1 = xt; Ptt+1 = t;
where xt is the vector of variables that must be forecasted, other than the future values
of the forecasting variables t themselves. Forecasts for arbitrary future horizons can





t+1    E^it+j 1xt+j = xj 1 t
for any j  1: That is, forecasts for horizons more than one period in the future are
formed by forecasting one's own future one-period-ahead forecasts, while one-period-
ahead forecasts are given by linear projections on the forecasting variables t:
25 Given
forecasts of this kind, the denitions (1.9) and (1.12) of the expectational variables
then imply that their evolution must satisfy (3.6).
Alternatively, we might assume, as Evans and McGough (2009) propose, that
people estimate the values of the expectational variables zt, not using the denitions
(1.9) and (1.12) of these variables in terms of long-horizon forecasts of variables with
25An advantage of this method is that forecasts E^itxt+j can be formed for arbitrarily large j,
using coecients that can be estimated using nite data sets, as there is no need to actually regress
observed values of xt+j on the prior forecasting variables t.
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objective denitions, but instead using the recursive relations (1.10) and (1.15) to
estimate values on the basis of one's current forecasts of one's own estimates in the
next period. These forecasts of one's own future estimates can be obtained by col-
lecting data on what one's estimates have been, and regressing them on the previous
period's values of the forecasting variables t: Also under this assumption, if there
is convergence to an RPE, the expectational variables will necessarily satisfy (3.6).
Note that these two approaches to \least-squares learning" are not mathematically
equivalent, but if in each case there is convergence to an RPE, then the RPE is the
same in both cases.26
Given a solution for the dynamics of the expectational variables fztg, the dynamics
of ination, output, and interest rates are then determined by equations (1.8), (1.11)
and (1.21), as under other specications of expectations. The dierence between
REE and RPE predictions then stems entirely from the dierence between (3.6) and
(1.23). When (3.5) holds, the predictions are necessarily the same.
3.1.2 Failure of Ricardian Equivalence
As an illustration of how macroeconomic dynamics in an RPE may dier from the
REE dynamics predicted in the case of a given policy rule, let us reconsider the
argument for Ricardian equivalence. Suppose that expectations are not Ricardian,
i.e., that people do not assume that the future path of primary surpluses must satisfy
(1.7), and instead estimate an econometric model to forecast future surpluses that
does not impose this condition as an a priori restriction.27 The TE dynamics are then
determined by the system consisting of (1.5), (1.17) and (1.18), given expectations of
the future evolution of the variables fpjt ; vitg dened by (1.6) and (1.15), and specied
paths for the policy variables fit; stg.
Suppose further that monetary policy is described by a Taylor rule of the form
(1.21), the coecients of which satisfy the Taylor Principle (1.24), while scal policy
26Since the learning dynamics outside the RPE are in general not identical, the conditions for
convergence to an RPE are not always the same in the two cases.
27Note that each household needs only to forecast its own tax obligations in excess of the value of
government purchases; its use of a forecasting model that violates (1.7) does not necessarily imply
that it believes that aggregate tax collections do not satisfy the present-value relation. While I
assume that the tax obligations of all households are the same, this is not necessarily known to the
households.
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is described by a feedback rule of the form




1   < b < 1; (3.8)
and st is an exogenous disturbance. This specication, together with (1.5), implies
debt dynamics that remain bounded in the case of any bounded processes for ination
and the nominal interest rate, and hence that model-consistent expectations will be
Ricardian, in the case of any REE involving bounded uctuations. Such a specica-
tion of monetary and scal policy implies the existence of a determinate REE in the
case of any bounded disturbance processes, and in this REE, the scal shocks fstg
have no eects on the evolution of output, ination or interest rates.28 Hence in such
a model, rational expectations imply Ricardian equivalence.
Let us consider instead the possible character of RPE dynamics. Suppose, for
example, that the vector of forecasting variables t consists only of the single state
variable st:
29 Then RPE forecasts are of the form et =  st;
30 for some vector of
coecients  : Substituting these forecasts into (1.17) and (1.18), one can solve for
the TE values of t; yt; it; and bt+1 as linear functions of bt, st and t.
The calculations are especially simple if we consider a case in which y = sb =
 = 0; and assume that there are no exogenous disturbances other than the scal
shock fstg, which is assumed to be unforecastable (white noise). In this limiting case,
there are no equilibrium uctuations in t or it; and the solutions for yt and bt+1 are
given by
yt = (
 1   1)(bt   st) +  vst; (3.9)
28See Woodford (2001) for further discussion of the consequences of a \locally Ricardian" scal
policy of this kind, under an REE analysis.
29Note that under the REE dynamics, if the disturbances are all unforecastable (white noise),
none of the state variables that must be forecasted by households or rms are forecastable, except
the primary surplus (that must be forecasted in order to estimate vit). It is perhaps not implausible
to suppose that households forecast future primary surpluses using only the current level of the
surplus. This would not, however, constitute a model-consistent forecast, as (1.5) and (3.7) imply
that an optimal forecast of future primary surpluses depends on the value of bt+1; or alternatively
upon both st and bt:










 1(bt   st); (3.10)
where  v (to be determined) is the rst element of  . It then follows from (1.6) that
vit = yt   (1  )bt (3.11)
for all i.
From this one can show that
e1t = Pt[yt+1   (1  )bt+1]
= ( 1   1)(1  )Pt[bt+1] + ( v + 1   1)Pt[st+1]
= [(1     b)( 1   1) + b v]Pt[bt+1];
where for any variable xt+1 known at date t, Pt[xt+1] denotes the linear projection
of xt+1 on st. (Here the rst line uses the fact that (3.11) must also hold at date
t + 1; the second line uses the fact that (3.9) must also hold at t + 1; and the third
line uses the fact that st+1 is determined by (3.7).) Writing Pt[bt+1] = bst; where
the coecient b depends only on  and b (not the assumed value of  v), one then
observes that  v must satisfy the consistency condition
 v = [(1     b)( 1   1) + b v]b: (3.12)
Under assumption (3.8), this equation has a unique solution for  v, and implies
that31
 v < 
 1   1: (3.13)
Equation (3.9) then implies that in the unique RPE, an exogenous positive innovation
in the size of the primary surplus st lowers current output yt. It will also reduce the
debt bt+1 carried into the next period, with persistent eects on economic activity in
later periods as well. Hence Ricardian equivalence does not hold in the RPE, even
though the specication of scal policy implies that in the model's unique bounded
REE, scal shocks have no eect on output, either immediately or subsequently.
While (3.10) implies that even under the RPE dynamics, a correct forecast would
satisfy (1.7) at all times, households' forecasts do not satisfy this condition, as a
resulting of forecasting future surpluses purely on the basis of the current primary
surplus; and because of this systematic forecasting error, Ricardian equivalence fails.
31See the Appendix for details.
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3.2 \Learnability" of REE
Even when the class of contemplated forecasting models does include the REE fore-
casts, and even when the estimator used to determine ^ is one that should be asymp-
totically consistent, in the case of a suciently long series of data generated by the
REE, it need not follow that ^ must converge asymptotically to RE under the TE
dynamics with learning. The reason is that, at each point in time, the observed data
will actually be generated by the behavior that results from current beliefs ^t; and
not by REE behavior. If a departure of people's estimates from RE gives rise to pat-
terns in the data that justify estimates even farther from RE, the learning dynamics
may diverge from RE beliefs almost surely, even if people start out with beliefs quite
near to RE beliefs. The question whether the REE can in fact be reached as the
asymptotic outcome of a learning process of the kind described above is therefore a
non-trivial one. Authors such as Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2003, 2006) propose as a design criterion for a monetary policy rule not only
that the rule should be consistent with a desirable REE, but that the rule should
imply that learning dynamics should converge to that REE, so that the desirable
equilibrium is \learnable."
3.2.1 Adaptive Estimation of Means
As a simple example, suppose that the disturbances t are all independently and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables, with mean zero. In this case, there
is a unique Markovian REE, in which zt = bt each period, and the RE forecasts
satisfy Etzt+1 = 0 at all times. In this equilibrium, t; yt and it will also each be
a linear function of t; and the RE forecast of each variable will be zero (i.e., the
constant steady-state value) at all times. Suppose furthermore that the class of
forecasting models considered by decisionmakers consists of all models under which
the forecast of each variable is a constant (that is, people believe that each of these
is an i.i.d. random variable, and seek only to estimate its mean). This simple class of
models includes the forecasting rule used in the Markovian REE, so the assumption
of such a restricted class does not in itself rule out the possibility of convergence to
RE beliefs.
Finally, suppose that people estimate the means of each of the stationary variables
29






where xt refers to any of the variables t; yt; it or to any of the elements of t; x^t is
the estimate of the variable's mean at date t (common to all agents); and 1 is the
date at which the available data series begins.32 This can be written recursively in
the form
x^t = x^t 1 + t(xt   x^t 1); (3.15)
where the \gain" t = 1=t indicates the degree to which estimates are adjusted in
response to an observation that diers from what has been forecasted. Note that if the
case that the economy were to reach the REE, each of the variables xt would indeed
be i.i.d., and the estimators (3.14) would almost surely converge asymptotically to
the true means (and hence to the REE beliefs), by the law of large numbers. Hence
the estimation strategy is not inherently incompatible with learning the REE beliefs.
Any set of estimates of the means implies forecasts given by33
E^itv
i
t+1 = y^t   g^t  






1   ^t + y^t + ^t; (3.17)
for each household and each rm. Hence in vector form we can write
et = C x^t; (3.18)
for a certain matrix of coecients C, where x^t is the vector of estimates (3.14). The
system consisting of (1.16), (1.17) and (1.21) allows us to solve for TE values
xt = D et + d t; (3.19)
for certain matrices D and d, where xt is the vector of actual values of the variables
xt. Equations (3.15), (3.18) and (3.19) then completely describe the TE dynamics of
32This is an example of least-squares learning, in which the vector st has a single element, 1, each
period.
33Here I use the notation g^t for the current estimate of the mean of the composite disturbance
g   Y n , for simplicity.
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actual values and forecasts with adaptive learning, given the exogenous disturbances
ftg and initial prior estimates x^t 1:
Combining these equations, we obtain a law of motion
[I   tDC] x^t = (1  t)x^t 1 + tdt (3.20)
for the estimates; thus the TE dynamics are uniquely dened as long as the matrix
in square brackets is non-singular, as I shall assume.34 In fact, all that matters about
these estimates is the implied forecasts et; so we can reduce the dimension of the
system (3.20) by pre-multiplying by the matrix C, yielding
[I   tA] et =  t [I   A] et 1 + tat; (3.21)
where A  CD; a  Cd: This equation determines the dynamics of the forecasts fetg
given initial forecasts and the evolution of the exogenous disturbances; the paths of
the other relevant variables are then given by (3.19). The TE dynamics converge
asymptotically to the REE dynamics (and subjective expectations coincide asymp-
totically with the REE forecasts) if and only if et ! 0 for large t.
Using the stochastic approximation methods introduced by Marcet and Sargent
(1989) and expounded in detail in Evans and Honkapohja (2001), one can show that
in the case of a decreasing gain sequence ftg like the one implied by (3.14), the path
for fetg implied by the stochastic law of motion (3.21) eventually converges to one of
the trajectories of the ordinary dierential equation (ODE) system
_e =  [I   A] e(); (3.22)
where  is a re-scaled time variable dened by  t 
Pt
s=1 s; and the dot indicates a
derivative with respect to  :
The ODE system (3.22) has a unique rest point e = 0 (corresponding to REE
forecasts) if and only if the 2  2 matrix A has no eigenvalue exactly equal to 1 (so
that I   A is non-singular); and the trajectories of (3.22) converge asymptotically
to this rest point if and only if both eigenvalues of A have real parts less than 1 (so
that both eigenvalues of I  A have positive real parts). If the latter condition holds,
(3.21) implies that et ! 0 with probability 1 as t grows large; beliefs asymptotically
34For any matrices C and D, this will be true for all small enough values of the gain t: We are
here only concerned with TE dynamics in the low-gain case.
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approach the REE forecasts, and one may say that the REE is \learnable" following
the procedure postulated above. If, instead, A has an eigenvalue with real part
greater than 1, the trajectories of (3.22) diverge from the rest point for almost all
initial conditions, and correspondingly, one can show that there is zero probability
of the beliefs implied by (3.21) remaining forever within a neighborhood of the REE
beliefs, even if people begin with initial beliefs near (or exactly equal to) the REE
beliefs.
Hence the learnability of the REE depends on the eigenvalues of A. In the case
of a policy (1.21) with ; y  0; one can show that both eigenvalues of A have real
part less than 1 (implying learnability) if and only if the response coecients satisfy
(1.24) | that is, policy conforms to the Taylor Principle.35 This is identical to the
condition for determinacy of the REE dynamics, and the connection between the two
results is not accidental. The matrix A has an eigenvalue equal to 1 if and only if the
model's steady-state ination rate and output gap are indeterminate: the associated
right eigenvector e indicates the direction in which a constant forecast (et = e for
all t) may dier from zero and still constitute a perfect foresight equilibrium if the
disturbances equal zero.36 (Any multiple of e is also a possible perfect-foresight steady
state in such a case.) But there exists a continuum of steady states if and only if the
matrix B in (1.23) has an eigenvalue equal to 1, and e must also be the associated
right eigenvector of B. We have seen above that B has such an eigenvalue if and only
if (1.24) holds with equality.
Intuitively, the Taylor Principle guarantees determinacy of the REE dynamics,
because perturbations of the expected future values of the elements of z result in a
current TE value of zt that is closer to zero than whatever is expected for the next
period; hence REE forecasts Etzt+j cannot be bounded for all j and also consistent
with this contraction requirement, unless they are exactly zero for all j. But the
fact that forecasts et dierent from zero give rise to TE values zt that are closer to
zero (on average) also implies that adaptive learning will move the forecasts closer
to zero (on average), so that the learning dynamics eventually converge to the REE
35In fact, when (1.24) is satised, both eigenvalues of A are inside the unit circle. When it fails,
there is a real eigenvalue greater than 1.
36If Ae = e; then forecasts et = e each period lead to outcomes xt = De each period. Then
x^t = De will be a perfect-foresight estimate each period, implying that the correct forecasts each
period will be CDe = e:
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forecasts.37
The analysis above assumes a very simple kind of least-squares learning, in which
the only contemplated forecasting rules are ones in which the forecasts are constants
(estimates of the means of the various variables) and the same for all horizons. But
Preston (2005) establishes the same conditions for learnability of the REE when
people use forecasting rules of the form
E^txt+1 = a^+ b^
0t
for each variable x, and estimate the coecients a^; b^0 by regressing observations of
xt j on t j 1 (for 0  j  t  1). Longer-horizon forecasts are then formed using
E^txt+k = a^+ b^
0 E^tt+k 1;
where forecasts of the future disturbances are based on estimated autoregressive mod-
els of each disturbance.38
A policy inconsistent with the Taylor Principle still leads to instability, because
perturbations of the estimated constant terms a^ result in average values of the vari-
ables that dier from zero by an even greater amount, leading to explosive dynamics
for the estimates as above. And on the other hand, conformity to the Taylor prin-
ciple remains sucient for stability of the learning dynamics, since the conditions
under which estimates of the response coecients b^0 diverge are even more restrictive
than those required for divergence of the estimates of the constant terms. Preston
also shows that the Taylor Principle is necessary and sucient for learnability of the
MSV REE (1.25) using this approach, in the case that the disturbances are AR(1)
processes (and hence Markovian). This result again follows because the key to conver-
gence to the REE forecasting rule is the convergence of the estimates of the constant
terms a^; and the mean dynamics of these estimates are unaected by the stationary
uctuations in the disturbances.39
37See Woodford (2003, chap. 4, sec. 2.3) for further discussion.
38See the discussion above in section 3.1.1 for further description of Preston's method of VAR-
based forecasts.
39Bullard and Mitra (2002) reach a similar conclusion, though on the basis of assumed TE dy-
namics derived by substituting subjective expectations for objective expectations in certain Euler
equations of the REE model, rather than deriving the TE dynamics from innite-horizon optimiza-
tion under subjective expectations, as above. For comparison of this \Euler-equation approach" to
modeling learning dynamics with the one used here, see Preston (2005) and Evans and McGough
(2009).
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3.2.2 The Possibility of a \Deation Trap"
Thus under this approach we again conclude that a rule (1.21) that fails to conform
to the Taylor Principle (1.24) makes the economy vulnerable to instability due to
self-fullling uctuations, though through a dierent mechanism than in section 1.5
above. The explosive dynamics of forecasts in the case of insucient feedback from
aggregate outcomes (especially for ination) to the interest-rate target generalizes
the informal argument of Friedman (1968) about the instability resulting from an
interest-rate peg.40
The problem is not necessarily avoided, however, by commitment to a rule that
satises the Taylor principle. The reason is that the linear TE dynamics analyzed
above cannot hold globally; in particular, policy cannot be described by (1.21) for
all possible ination rates and output gaps, because of the zero lower bound on the
nominal interest rate.41 Even if the central bank follows (1.21) with coecients satis-
fying (1.24) until the lower bound becomes a binding constraint, the altered response
at low levels of ination and output implies the existence of a second (deationary)
perfect-foresight steady state consistent with the policy rule, as discussed by Ben-
habib et al. (2001); and the insensitivity of the interest rate to variations in ination
and output once the lower bound binds implies that the learning dynamics will be
unstable near the forecasting rule associated with the deationary REE.42
This is illustrated in Figure 1, where the global behavior of the ODE system
corresponding to (3.22) is plotted now taking into account the zero lower bound
(ZLB). Note that the third row of (3.19) can be written as it = D
0
iet; if we average
out the values of t (in order to describe the mean dynamics, which approximately
characterize the asymptotic dynamics of our system). The asymptotic dynamics
described by (3.22) are therefore consistent with the zero lower bound as long as e()
40Howitt (1992) was the rst attempt to formalize Friedman's argument through an analysis of
the convergence of learning dynamics to the REE.
41The other structural relations assumed above are merely local approximations to relations that
should actually be nonlinear; but even if they are assumed to hold globally, the zero lower bound
prevents (3.21) from holding globally.
42Evans and Honkapohja (2010) and Benhabib et al. (2012) show this in the context of NK models
with adaptive learning closely related to the one presented here.
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remains in the region satisfying the inequality43
r +D0ie  0; (3.23)
where r > 0 is the steady-state real rate of interest.44 Because both elements of Di
are positive under the sign assumptions stated above, the region in Figure 1 where
the dynamics (3.22) apply is the region above and to the right of the line labeled
ZLB; along which (3.23) holds with equality.
When (3.23) is violated, (1.21) must instead be replaced by
it =  r < 0: (3.24)
Solving the system consisting of (1.16){(1.17) and (3.24), one obtains a linear solution
of the form
xt = x+Det + dt (3.25)
instead of (3.19). The complete TE solution for xt is then given by (3.19) when
(3.23) is satised, and (3.25) otherwise. (Note that this is a continuous, piecewise
linear solution.) Repeating the derivation of (3.22), one nds that _e is given by (3.22)
when (3.23) is satised (a region that includes a neighborhood of the origin), and
instead by
_e =  (I   A)e+ Cx (3.26)
in the region where the inequality is reversed, where A  CD: (Note that this makes
_e a continuous, piecewise-linear function of e.) This is the system the trajectories of
which are plotted in Figure 1.45
One observes that the origin e = 0 (corresponding to the zero-ination steady
state) is a rest point of these dynamics, and locally stable under the ODE dynamics
as discussed above. If the dynamics (3.22) applied globally (i.e., if the ZLB constraint
were not an issue), this steady state would also be globally stable: the learning
dynamics would converge to it asymptotically from all possible initial states of belief.
43Recall that in the notation used here, it is the amount by which the nominal interest rate exceeds
its steady-state value, so that the requirement for the nominal interest rate to be non-negative is
r + it  0:
44Because we log-linearize our equations around a stationary equilibrium with zero ination, r is
also the steady-state nominal interest rate.
45Analytical derivations of qualitative properties of this gure are given in the Appendix.
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But the dynamics when the ZLB constraint binds are dierent; as a consequence,
there is a second steady state in the region below the ZLB line, at
e = e  (I   A) 1Cx;
corresponding to steady-state values
 = i =  r < 0; y =  (1  )r= < 0:
Because I   A has two real eigenvalues, one positive and one negative, trajectories
of (3.26) converge to e only from initial conditions along the line SM in the gure,
the one-dimensional stable manifold. Trajectories above and to the right of this
line eventually converge to the zero-ination steady state, while those below and
to the left of it diverge from e in the opposite direction, eventually being drawn
into (and remaining forever in) the shaded region. Because the actual dynamics of
ination are stochastic (even for arbitrarily large t) rather than precisely equal to
the approximating ODE dynamics, there is actually zero probability of convergence
of the learning dynamics to the REE represented by e, even from initial conditions
on the line SM ; the learning dynamics must diverge from e in one direction or the
other.46
One might think that the non-learnability of the deationary REE (while the
learning dynamics are instead locally convergent near the REE consistent with the
central bank's ination target) implies that one need not be concerned about the
possibility of falling into a self-fullling \deation trap" of the kind stressed by Ben-
habib et al., on the basis of the REE analysis. But the divergent dynamics near the
46Figure 2 of Evans and Honkapohja (2010) is qualitatively similar, though plotted in the plane
of ination and output expectations (^t; y^t). These authors obtain an autonomous dierential
equation system in the ^   y^ plane only by assuming that interest-rate forecasts are obtained from
ination and output forecasts using people's knowledge of the policy rule. This is not consistent
with the assumption made here that interest rates (like all other variables) are forecasted on the
basis of past observations of that variable. In particular, when trajectories in Figure 1 cross the
ZLB line, the nominal interest rate becomes positive, and under the learning rule assumed here, a
positive nominal interest rate must be expected in the future as well. Under the Evans-Honkapohja
forecasting assumption, instead, people would continue for some time to forecast a zero nominal
interest rate into the indenite future, because ination and output expectations (which lag behind
actual ination and output) would still be at levels that would imply an expectation that the zero
lower bound should continue (indenitely) to bind.
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deationary REE include the existence of trajectories that diverge in the direction of
ever-lower levels of ination and output (those in the shaded region of the gure),47
as a result of which the learning dynamics do imply the possibility of a \deation
trap," albeit not one that involves convergence to the deationary REE emphasized
by Benhabib et al. As Evans and Honkapohja (2010) and Benhabib et al. (2012) dis-
cuss, to the extent that expectations are necessarily formed in this backward-looking
way, the only way out of such a \trap" is to use other tools of policy (such as scal
stimulus48) to raise ination and/or output long enough for ination and output ex-
pectations to return to the region in which the learning dynamics can be expected
to converge toward the target REE without further articial support. In this view,
other tools of policy have an important stabilization role to play in deep crises, even
if monetary policy alone suces as a stabilization tool except when unusual shocks
drive expectations far enough away from the target REE forecasting rule.
3.3 Learning Dynamics as a Source of Persistence
Much of the early literature on TE dynamics with learning was concerned with the
question of asymptotic convergence to an REE; the positive prediction of interest was
whether an REE (or which REE) should be reached, and hence observed in practice.
But the learning dynamics themselves might also be regarded as a source of positive
predictions. One such positive prediction of particular interest is the existence of
persistent uctuations resulting from the dynamics induced by evolving estimates of
the coecients of people's forecasting rules.
47In fact, one can show that all trajectories that begin in the region that is below both the ZLB
line and the SM line converge eventually to the shaded region, where they remain forever, and
diverge farther and farther from the deationary steady state.
48Even if scal policy expectations are Ricardian, and the forecasts et are purely backward-looking
as assumed above, an increase in government purchases should increase output and ination, by
increasing the term gt in (1.16). If a current increase in net government transfers does not reduce
the present value of forecasted future net transfers | for example, because future primary surpluses
are forecasted using an estimator like (3.14) | then an increase in net transfers will also increase




To study the macroeconomic dynamics that result from learning, it is convenient to
assume that the gain t in (3.15) takes some constant value 0 <  < 1 for all t,
so that convergence to the REE never occurs, even asymptotically. A \constant-
gain" learning algorithm of this kind may be justied as making sense if people
believe that the coecients of the correct forecasting model may shift over time, and
consequently place more weight on the most recent observations in their estimates of
the current coecients.49 In this case, the predicted TE dynamics are time-invariant,
and can be characterized in terms of predicted unconditional moments (variances,
autocovariances, etc.).
The dynamics of forecasts are again given by (3.21), but now with the constant
value  substituted for t; the implied TE dynamics of other variables are then given
by (3.19).50 Equation (3.21) can alternatively be written in the form
et =  et 1 +  t; (3.27)
where
  (1  )[I   A] 1;   [I   A] 1a:
If policy satises (1.24), both eigenvalues of A are inside the unit circle, so that
[I   A] is invertible,  and  are well-dened, and both eigenvalues of  are also
inside the unit circle. Hence (3.27) denes stationary dynamics for the forecasts fetg
and consequently for the variables fxtg as well.
Equation (3.21) implies that the forecasts will be serially correlated, even if the
disturbances are i.i.d. More precisely, it implies that each element of et will be
a linear combination of two rst-order autoregressive processes (the innovations in
which are generally correlated), with coecients of serial correlation equal to the
49See Sargent (1993) or Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for further discussion.
50The type of adaptive learning dynamics considered here are again of a fairly simple kind, since
people's forecasting rules are assumed simply to forecast constant future values for each of the
variables, and the only coecients that must be learned are the estimated means of each variable.
However, as Eusepi and Preston (2012b) discuss, even if one allows updating of the slope coecients
of a more complex linear regression model, in a local linear approximation to the implied TE
dynamics, linearizing around the REE steady state, there are no additional dynamics resulting from
the updating of the slope coecients; the updating of the additional coecients has only second-
order eects on the TE dynamics.
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two eigenvalues of : If  is small (estimates are based on a fairly long history), the
eigenvalues of  will be near 1, and these processes will be highly persistent. It then
follows from (3.19) that uctuations in ination and the output gap will have highly
persistent components under the TE dynamics with learning. This contrasts sharply
with the prediction of the REE analysis, according to which ination and the output
gap should both be serially uncorrelated if all fundamental disturbances are, as a
consequence of (1.25).
If the fundamental disturbances are instead themselves serially correlated, then
persistent uctuations in ination and output are possible even under the REE dy-
namics. However, empirical New Keynesian models, such as those of Christiano et
al. (2005) or Smets and Wouters (2007), generally nd it necessary to introduce
additional sources of persistence (indexation of prices and wages to past ination,
adjustment costs for expenditure), of debatable microeconomic realism, in order to
t the kind of persistence that is actually observed.51 Learning dynamics provide an
alternative potential source of intrinsic persistence, and some studies (e.g., Milani,
2005, 2007, 2011; Slobodyan and Wouters, 2009) nd that there is less need for ad
hoc structural persistence in econometric models that assume least-squares learning
rather than rational expectations.52
3.3.2 Consequences for Policy Evaluation
The additional dynamics resulting from learning can change one's conclusions regard-
ing the relative desirability of alternative monetary policy rules, even with respect to
comparisons among rules that do not imply explosive learning dynamics. As a simple
example, suppose that the central bank's short-run ination target depends linearly
on the cost-push shock,
t = uut; (3.28)
51See Woodford (2003, chap. 5) for discussion of the reasons for this.
52Eusepi and Preston (2011) similarly nd that the introduction of learning dynamics introduces
a new channel for the propagation of the eects of technology shocks in an otherwise standard real
business cycle model, and argue that the model with learning produces uctuations more similar to
observed business cycles. Even larger departures from REE business-cycle dynamics are predicted
in the case of a model of learning that involves discrete switching between simple forecasting models
of dramatically dierent character, as proposed by DeGrauwe (2010).
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for some 0  u  1; and it is adjusted each period as necessary in order to ensure
that t = 

t : The required interest rate can be determined, as a function of current
disturbances and expectations, from equations (1.16) and (1.17); these equations also
indicate the implied evolution of the output gap.
Under the further assumption of RE beliefs, the model predicts that
yt =  (1  u) 1ut; (3.29)
and hence that the unconditional variances of ination and of the output gap will be
var() = 2u
2
u; var(y) = (1  u)2 22u;
where 2u is the variance of the cost-push shock. It follows that for all u in this
interval, increasing u increases the volatility of equilibrium ination, but reduces
the volatility of the equilibrium output gap. If policy is concerned to minimize some
weighted average of the two variances, the optimal choice of u will be somewhere
between the two extremes, at a point that depends on the relative weight on the two
stabilization objectives.
If we instead assume adaptive learning of the kind specied by (3.15), substitution
of the policy rule (3.28) into the TE relation (1.17) implies that the output gap each
period will be given by
yt =  (1  u) 1ut   (1  ) 1p^t ; (3.30)
where p^t is the common forecast at date t of the value of p

t+1: The latter forecast
will be given by (3.17); if the estimates of the means of each of the variables evolve
in accordance with (3.15), for some 0 <  < 1; this implies that
p^t = (1  )p^t 1 + [(1  ) 1t + yt + t]:
Substituting (3.28) and (3.30) for t and yt respectively in this expression yields a
law of motion for the forecast of the form
p^t = p^

t 1 + u ut; (3.31)
where
0 <   (1  )(1  )
1  (1  ) < 1;  

[1  (1  )] > 0
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both are independent of the choice of u:
Equation (3.31) implies that if u > 0; a positive cost-push shock immediately
raises the forecast p^t ; and the forecast continues to be higher in subsequent periods
as well (to an extent that decreases exponentially over time). Comparing (3.30) with
the REE prediction (3.29), we see that with adaptive learning, the output reduction
in the period of the shock is greater than would occur under rational expectations;
moreover, the negative eect on the output gap persists, rather than being limited
to the period of the shock. For both reasons, a given value of u > 0 does not
reduce the predicted variance of the output gap as much as is predicted by the REE
analysis, though it continues to to increase the predicted variance of ination by
the same amount. Thus the trade-o between ination stabilization and output-gap
stabilization is steeper in the case of learning: less reduction in the variance of the
output gap is achieved by a given increase in the variance of ination. The implication,
as argued by Orphanides and Williams (2005), is that under given preferences with
regard to ination and output-gap stability, it will be optimal to choose a lower value
of u (maintaining tighter control of ination) when one recognizes that people must
learn to forecast macroeconomic conditions, relative to what one would conclude from
the REE analysis.53
4 TE Dynamics with Nearly Correct Beliefs
There is, however, another way of ensuring that one's model's predictions do not
depend on a supposition that people will fail to notice patterns in the data that
should actually be easily discerned. These alternative approaches are based not on
an explicit specication of the procedure used to look for such patterns, as in the
case of econometric learning models, but rather on a direct requirement that proba-
bility beliefs | however obtained | not be too dierent from the true probabilities
(according to one's model). Approaches of this kind propose no model of how people
reason to the probability beliefs that they hold, but instead focus on dening the
respects in which subjective beliefs should reasonably be expected to be similar to
53Orphanides and Williams consider a one-parameter family of policies similar to the one consid-
ered here, but in the context of a simpler model of the way in which expectations aect aggregate
supply. For implications of learning dynamics for the optimal choice of a policy rule within more
complex families of candidate policies, see Gaspar et al. (2011).
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objective probabilities, and the other respects in which one might expect more varia-
tion in subjective beliefs. In this section, I discusses two examples of how this might
be done: the \rational belief equilibria" of Mordecai Kurz and coauthors (Kurz, 1994,
1997, 2012; Kurz and Motolese, 2011), and the \near-rational expectations" proposed
by Woodford (2010) and explored further in Adam and Woodford (2012).
Before describing these approaches, it is important to note that a hypothesis that
beliefs are \nearly correct" does not imply that they are nearly the same as (any
possible) REE beliefs. The extent to which beliefs are correct depends on their con-
formity with the actual TE dynamics, which may dier greatly from REE dynamics,
and not their conformity with REE predictions. This dierence is emphasized in
particular by Kurz (2012), who emphasizes the possibility of sizeable aggregate uc-
tuations even when the magnitude of exogenous disturbances to \fundamentals" is
much smaller than must be postulated to account for the uctuations using DSGE
models that assume rational expectations.
4.1 \Rational Belief Equilibria"
Kurz (1994) proposes a relaxation of the rational expectations hypothesis in which
the probability beliefs of decisionmakers are required to imply model-consistent values
for some data moments, but not for all of the data moments that are relevant to their
forecasts and hence to their decisions. Certain quantities (including conventional
macroeconomic aggregates, such as rate of growth of GDP or the CPI) are assumed
to be objectively measurable, and as a consequence everyone is assumed to agree
about the current and past values of these variables. The postulate of \rational
beliefs" (RB) then requires that in any stationary equilibrium (a \rational belief
equilibrium," RBE) consistent with some time-invariant policy, everyone must also
agree about all of the unconditional rst and second moments54 of these objectively
measurable variables, and assign values to these moments that coincide with the
predictions of the model about this particular RBE.55
54By \all second moments" I mean to include all covariances between leads and lags of the various
variables.
55In fact, Kurz (1994) proposes the stronger postulate that the subjective assessment of the
unconditional joint distribution of the objectively measurable variables must coincide with their
model-implied unconditional distribution. In the case of a linear model with additive Gaussian
disturbances, of the kind used in applications such as Kurz (2012), and in the example presented
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But these variables are not the only ones on the basis of which individuals form
their forecasts; there are also subjective variables (\belief states") about which they
need not agree. A given decisionmaker is assumed to have coherent probability beliefs
about the joint distribution of her own belief states and the objectively measurable
variables, on the basis of which the belief states modify her forecasts of the future
paths of the objectively measurable variables; but these data moments need not be
ones about which others agree, and the probability beliefs of an individual need not
coincide in this respect with the predictions of the model. It is in this latter respect
that the RB postulate is weaker than RE. Insofar as people are assumed to learn the
correct values of some data moments but not others, the RBE concept is a cousin of
the RPE concept discussed in section 3.1.
The content of the RB postulate, as well as the sense in which it is weaker than
RE, is best illustrated using an example. Suppose that the natural rate of output is
the sum of two components,
Y nt = Y
n
t + 2t; (4.1)
where the permanent component Y nt evolves as a random walk,
Y nt = Y
n
t 1 + 1t; (4.2)
with f1tg an i.i.d. innovation distributed as N(0; 21), and the transitory compo-
nent 2t is another i.i.d. innovation, distributed as N(0; 
2
2) and independent of the
permanent shocks. If the process fY nt g is objectively measurable but its permanent
and transitory components are not, and no other objectively measurable variables
provide information about this decomposition, then an optimal estimate of the per-
manent component (or optimal forecast of the long-run level) of Y nt at any time t is
given by an exponentially-weighted moving average56




where the smoothing factor 0 <  < 1 is given by
 =
2
2 + q +
p
q2 + 4q





below, identity of the two unconditional distributions is equivalent to identity of the complete list
of rst and second moments.
56This corresponds to the Bayesian posterior mean, or minimum-mean-squared-error forecast,
using a Kalman lter (Harvey, 1989, chap. 4), as originally derived by Muth (1960).
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Conditional only on objectively measurable data, then, an optimal forecast of the
future natural rate at any horizon k  0 will be given by
EtY
n
t+k = Yt: (4.3)
Suppose, however, that in addition to the objectively measurable data, each in-
dividual price-setter j has a subjective estimate of the permanent component, that I
shall denote zjt : If each price-setter correctly understands the laws of motion (4.1){






rather than by (4.3). Note that each individual's beliefs are described by a completely
specied, internally consistent probability measure, that is moreover consistent with
the true rst and second moments of all objectively measurable data; for example,
these beliefs imply correct (model-consistent) values for the unconditional moments




t k) for all k, as these can be derived from (4.1){(4.2).
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But individual beliefs about the statistics of the subjective belief state zjt and its
co-movement with objectively measurable data need not coincide with the beliefs of
others, or with the way that the model describes the evolution of these variables.
In our example, while each individual j believes that zjt = Y
n
t ; it does not follow
that zjt must take the same numerical value for all j. Moreover, even if, as in Kurz
and Motolese (2011) and Kurz (2012), we suppose that the population distribution
of subjective beliefs, and hence the population mean Zt 
R
zjt dj, are objectively
measurable data, it does not follow that zjt must equal Zt for each individual. In-
dividuals can be aware that their personal estimate zjt diers from the average esti-
mate, without any internal inconsistency of their beliefs. The RB postulate requires
that people all have model-consistent beliefs about unconditional moments such as
E[Y nt  Zt];E[Zt]; cov(Y nt+k; Y nt  Zt); and so on. But awareness of these moments
and observation of Zt does not give a price-setter any reason to doubt the validity
of her forecast (4.4), given her belief in the laws of motion (4.1){(4.2) and her belief
57Kurz does not refer to these common beliefs as \correct" beliefs about unconditional moments,
but only as \empirical frequencies." However, in applications such as Kurz and Motolese (2011) or
Kurz (2012), the calculations used to explain or predict data are carried out under the assumption
that the empirical frequencies correspond to model-implied unconditional moments, under time-
invariant stochastic processes for the various disturbances specied in the model.
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that zjt is an accurate (but personal) observation of the value of Y
n
t . (This simply
requires each individual to believe that others' personal assessments of the value of
the permanent component are erroneous, even though she understands that, like her,
they each believe their personal assessments to be correct.58)
As one possible example of how this makes possible an additional source of
aggregate uctuations, suppose that people's subjective assessments are given by
zjt = Yt + 
j
t ; where 
j
t is a random term that evolves independently of all \funda-
mental" variables, including both the permanent and transitory components of Y nt .
Thus, since Yt is objectively measurable, the subjective state z
j
t reects no additional
information about the future evolution of the natural rate (or any other fundamen-
tals). Moreover, suppose that the errors jt are correlated across individuals, so that
the aggregate error t 
R
jtdj is not equal to zero. Then because t represents
an error in the average estimate of a variable that is relevant for pricing decisions




t   Yt]dj), it will aect the determination of
endogenous aggregate variables, such as output and ination; and variation in t will
be an additional source of variability in these variables, in addition to the random
variation in fundamentals such as f1t; 2tg.
To illustrate the eects of uctuations in the aggregate belief state on endogenous
variables, let the monetary policy rule be specied by a target criterion: that is, the
central bank adjusts its instrument as necessary in order to ensure that the linear
relationship
t + (Yt   Yt) = 0 (4.5)
holds at all times.59 This represents a form of \exible ination targeting" (Svensson,
1999), where the concept of the output gap in the central bank's target criterion
58Thus this equilibrium concept allows a much wider range of possible specications of belief
dynamics than a rational-expectations model with \private information," of the kind considered by
Rondina and Walker (2012). In the latter paper, all individuals are assumed to agree about the
joint distribution of all publicly or privately observable variables, though individuals do not observe
other individuals' private signals about the separate components of the aggregate disturbance. In
Kurz's work, instead, people \agree to disagree." It is therefore not necessary to suppose that
there is anything secret about individuals' subjective beliefs; it is only the basis for accepting these
subjective assessments as correct that is not shared.
59The state-contingent path for the interest rate it required in order for (4.5) to hold each period
will depend on the subjective expectations of both price-setters and consumers. I suppose here that
the central bank observes average expectations when setting it, and so can implement a reaction
function that makes (4.5) a necessary consequence of the TE relations that determine t and yt,
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is output relative to the central bank's estimate of long-run potential, rather than
relative to the current natural rate of output. As a simple example in which belief
uctuations provide an independent source of aggregate variability, suppose that t
evolves as an AR(1) process,
t = t 1 + t; (4.6)
where 0   < 1; and ftg is an i.i.d. innovation, with distribution N(0; 2) inde-
pendent of all fundamental states. We can then solve for the equilibrium dynamics
of ination and output implied by the TE relations, (4.5) and the above assumptions
about subjective expectations, using the method of undetermined coecients.
Let us conjecture beliefs on the part of each price-setter j of the form
E^jt p
j
t+1 = 1( Yt   zjt ) + 2( Yt   Zt); (4.7)




t+1dj = ( Yt   Zt);
where   1 + 2: Let us also suppose for simplicity that the cost-push shock ut is
equal to zero at all times.60 The TE relation (1.17) then implies that ination and















Since equations (4.8){(4.9) are relationships among objectively measurable vari-
ables,61 the RB postulate requires that the subjective probability beliefs of each
price-setter be consistent with them. These relations, together with the laws of mo-
tion (4.1){(4.2) and (4.6) for the exogenous aggregate state variables, further imply
regardless of what those subjective expectations may be. Thus (4.5) can be treated as an equilibrium
relation in solving for the equilibrium dynamics under a given hypothesis about expectations.
60Note that even under this assumption, the model implies the existence of equilibrium uctuations
in ination and in the output gap, owing to the discrepancy between the concept of potential output
( Yt) used in the central bank's target criterion (4.5) and the one (Y
n
t ) that shifts the AS relation
(1.17).
61Recall that t = Zt  Yt; and the average belief state Zt is assumed to be objectively measurable.
46















for any horizon k  1; where Et[] refers to the expectation conditional on the history
of all exogenous states up through period t, including the (unobserved) value of Y nt .
If price-setters are assumed to correctly understand these laws of motion,62 then
their subjective forecasts of future ination and output gaps must conform to these
equations as well, but with the value of Y nt replaced by each individual's subjective
estimate of this state. Thus for any price-setter j, each of the forecasts is a linear
function of Yt   zjt and t  Zt   Yt.63
Substituting these subjective forecasts into denition (1.12), we can obtain an
expression for E^jt p
j
t+1 as a linear function of Yt   zjt and Yt   Zt; as conjectured
in (4.7). We now however have expressions for the coecients 1; 2 (given in the
Appendix) as functions of the assumed value of : Requiring the implied values of
these coecients to equal their conjectured values yields two linear equations to solve
for the unknown coecients 1; 2. As shown in the Appendix, our sign assumptions
on parameters imply the existence of a unique solution, with  > 0:
We thus obtain TE dynamics consistent with the RB postulate in which uctua-
tions in the aggregate belief state t cause random variations in ination and output.
62The RB postulate requires that price-setters all correctly understand the autocorrelation func-
tion of the objectively measurable process ftg, but it does not require that they agree that an
unbiased forecast of t+k at time t depends only on the current value t; they may have subjective
judgments about the likely future path of the aggregate belief state that they believe are more ac-
curate than the forecast that could be made on the basis of objectively measurable data alone. Here
I make the more restrictive assumption that no one believes that they have additional insight into
the future evolution of any exogenous states except for believing in their personal estimates of the
permanent component Y nt :
63Kurz and Motolese (2011) say that \those who believe the economy is stationary" will necessarily
forecast using the \empirical measure" | that is, using only the information contained in the history
of objectively measurable variables, and so make forecasts such as (4.3). But in fact, the subjective
probability beliefs specied here imply that ft; yt; Yt   Y nt ; Y nt   Y nt ; Yt   Zt;Y nt g are jointly
stationary processes; and the same is true of the RBE beliefs specied in the applications proposed
by Kurz and Motolese (2011) and Kurz (2012). The crucial issue is actually not stationarity, but
whether variables other than objectively measurable variables are also used in forecasting.
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It is instructive to compare this solution with the REE dynamics under policy rule
(4.5). We may assume as above that each individual observes a personal state variable
zjt (a \gut feeling," if one likes), that is distributed as assumed above; but under the
RE hypothesis, each individual must correctly understand the joint distribution of zjt
and all other variables. This would mean correctly understanding that zjt contains no
information that is useful for predicting the future path of the natural rate of output
(given that Yt is independently observable), and similarly that Zt is uninformative.
RE forecasts of all variables would then correspond simply to the expectations of
those variables conditional on the observed history of the natural rate of output;
thus, for example, the common forecast of the future natural rate of output would be
given by (4.3). It is shown in the Appendix that under policy rule (4.5), the unique
stationary REE is one in which ination and the output gap are given by equations
(4.8){(4.9), but with  = 0; whereas  > 0 in the RBE discussed above. Thus the
RBE beliefs do not change the response of ination or output to exogenous uctua-
tions in the natural rate of output, but result in increased variability of both ination
and the output gap for any value of , relative to the REE prediction, owing to the
existence of uctuations unrelated to any changes in fundamentals, but due purely
to variation in the aggregate belief state.
The above simple calculation may make it appear that the RBE hypothesis makes
denite quantitative predictions about the evolution of endogenous variables under
a given policy rule, but this is actually not true; the RBE constructed above is only
one possible example of TE dynamics consistent with the RB postulate under the
assumed policy rule. First of all, there is an RBE of the kind assumed above for
any specication of the serial correlation coecient  and of the innovation variance
2 for the process ftg. Moreover, there is no reason why ftg must be an AR(1)
process; this allowed us to verify the conjecture that subjective forecasts were of
the form (4.7), but we might equally well have assumed a more complex process for
ftg, and still solved for an RBE, in which however, subjective forecasts would be
correspondingly more complex. Thus if we allow ftg to be any process in some
larger parametric family, we can obtain a multi-parameter family of RBE associated
with the given policy (4.5). But even this understates the multiplicity of possible
RBE. For it was not necessary to have assumed that people believe that they have
an additional (personal) awareness of the decomposition of Y nt into permanent and
transitory components, but no additional personal insight into the economy's future
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evolution of any other sort. Allowing for other types of subjective beliefs (that need
not be correlated with actual outcomes, according to one's model, in the way that
people believe that they are) would further expand the set of RBE solutions consistent
with a given policy rule.
Kurz and coauthors argue that the more exible relationship between the evo-
lution of exogenous fundamentals and that of endogenous variables allowed by this
relaxation of the RE hypothesis can make sense of some of the empirical diculties
faced by RE models. For example, Kurz and Motolese (2011) discuss RBE of an asset-
pricing model in which there is a risky asset in xed supply and an exogenously given
riskless rate of return (independent of the quantity invested in the riskless asset).
The dividend on the risky asset is an exogenous process, about the future evolution
of which individual investors believe they have additional personal insight, beyond
the information contained in the past history of the dividend, just as in the case of
subjective forecasts of the natural rate of output in the above example. In the RBE,
variations in the aggregate belief state become an additional source of variation in
equilibrium asset prices, and in particular result in a time-varying risk premium, of
the kind that is found to be empirically important in many asset markets.
Kurz and Motolese estimate the parameters of their model using data on term
premia associated with federal funds futures and Treasury bills, and nd that al-
lowance for the more exible class of equilibria allows the data to be t better; their
best-tting RBE implies that more than half of the measured risk premia are due to
uctuations in the aggregate belief state. This suggests that the kind of additional
exibility allowed by the concept of an RBE may be of empirical relevance. At the
same time, because the predictions of the more general theory are much less specic,
it is not obvious that ndings such as those of Kurz and Motolese can be regarded
as conrming a specic theoretical view of the nature of subjective beliefs.64
Relaxation of the RE hypothesis also has potential consequences for policy design;
64While the sets of possible RBE discussed in papers such as Kurz and Motolese (2011) and
Kurz (2012) involve only a few free parameters, this is not because the RB postulate alone allows
one to derive such specic conclusions | a large number of additional (theoretically unmotivated)
assumptions are made as well, in order to obtain equilibria of a particular form. Moreover, in neither
of these applied papers are all of the restrictions implied by the RB postulate imposed; the solutions
proposed as possible accounts of actual data are actually examples of an even weaker version of the
RBE concept, and the proposed restrictions on the stochastic processes characterizing the data are
mainly adopted for convenience rather than following from a conception of rationality.
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as illustrated by the above example, the degree of macroeconomic stability guaran-
teed by commitment to a given policy rule may not be as great as a mere analysis of
the REE dynamics consistent with it would suggest. This raises the possibility that
alternative rules might provide more robust approaches to stabilization, even if they
do not lead to a superior REE. While there will not be a unique RBE consistent with
a given policy rule, or even a unique RBE associated with a given restricted state
space (as in the analysis of MSV-REE above), it may be compare the data moments
associated with the entire range of possible RBE, for alternative parameterizations
of a policy rule. Kurz (2012) undertakes an illustrative analysis of this kind of the
consequences of alternative central-bank reaction functions in the context of a New
Keynesian model closely related to the one presented here. However, the compar-
isons undertaken consider only certain parametric classes of RBE, and it is unclear
why attention should be restricted to these specic types of equilibria. This seems
an important limitation of the Kurz approach for purposes of policy analysis. The
alternative approach presented next instead allows a clear delineation of the set of
equilibria consistent with a given policy rule.
4.2 \Near-Rational Expectations"
Rather than distinguishing a priori between data moments that individuals should
correctly assess and those that they may not, depending on the nature of the vari-
able in question, the assumption of \near-rational expectations" in Woodford (2010)
instead denes a set of probability beliefs that are close enough to the predictions
of one's model to be plausibly held by decisionmakers in such a situation, on purely
statistical grounds. Essentially, an alternative probability distribution is \close" to
the predicted probabilities of outcomes in a given equilibrium if the alternative distri-
bution represents a sample distribution of outcomes that could be observed in some
nite number of repetitions of the equilibrium. This requires, for example, that \near-
rational" subjective expectations assign zero probability to all outcomes that occur
with zero probability in equilibrium.
This means that each agent's subjective probability measure over possible paths
for all variables must be absolutely continuous with respect to the equilibrium proba-
bility measure. This in turn implies there must exist a scalar stochastic process fmtg
for each agent | the agent's belief distortion factor | with mt  0; Etmt+1 = 1 at
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all times, such that the agent's subjective one-period-ahead forecast of any variable
Xt+1 is given by
E^tXt+1 = Et[mt+1Xt+1]; (4.10)
where Et[] indicates the conditional expectation under the true (model-implied) prob-
abilities in the particular equilibrium. Thus a value mt+1 > 1 in a particular state
of the world at date t+ 1 implies that, conditional on reaching the predecessor state
at date t, the agent exaggerates the probability of reaching this state relative to the
correct equilibrium probability. Internal consistency of individual probability beliefs
then implies that longer-horizon subjective forecasts are correspondingly given by
E^tXt+j = Et[mt+1   mt+jXt+j]:
The degree of discrepancy between subjective and objective probability beliefs can
then be measured by the degree to which the distortion factor fmtg diers from a
constant factor, equal to 1 in all states. A measure of the degree of discrepancy in one-
period-ahead beliefs (looking forward from any period t) with appealing properties is
the relative entropy between the subjective and objective conditional probabilities
Rt  Et[mt+1 logmt+1]: (4.11)
This is non-negative convex function of the belief distortion factor that achieves its
minimum possible value of zero if and only if mt+1 = 1 almost surely (the RE case).
Moreover, the probability of observing a sample frequency distribution for the possible
outcomes at date t + 1 that is close to any given subjective measure, in the case of
a large (but nite) number of independent draws from the equilibrium probability
measure, is (in the case of a large enough number of draws) a decreasing function of
the relative entropy of the subjective measure.65 Hence subjective beliefs under which
Rt is small (though positive) each period are ones that could plausibly be maintained
even by an agent with considerable experience of typical equilibrium outcomes.
Woodford (2010) accordingly denes an equilibrium with \near-rational expecta-
tions" (NRE) as a situation in which each agent optimizes on the basis of internally
consistent probability beliefs for which Rt is suciently small each period, when cal-
culated with respect to the equilibrium probability measure describing the outcomes
that result (in each possible state of the world) from their collective choices. Note
65See, for example, Cover and Thomas (2006).
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that the equilibrium measure will not generally be the REE measure, because people
act on the basis of non-REE beliefs; hence NRE equilibrium outcomes need not be
near the REE outcomes in order for beliefs to be \near-rational."
In the context of the NK model described above, an NRE equilibrium (NREE)
corresponds to stochastic processes fvitg and distortion factors fmitg for each house-
hold, and processes fpjt g and distortion factors fmjtg for each rm, such that (1.10)
and (1.15) hold each period when subjective forecasts are given by (4.10) for each
agent, and the distortion factors imply that the relative entropy for each agent re-
mains within some bound. If, for example, we assume a monetary policy rule of the
form (1.21) and restrict attention to the special case of common subjective probabil-
ity beliefs for all agents, then an NREE corresponds to a vector stochastic process
fztg and distortion factor fmtg, such that
zt = B Et[mt+1zt+1] + bt (4.12)
holds each period (where B and b are again the matrices in (1.22)), and the relative
entropy (4.11) implied by the distortion factor satises the specied bound.
4.3 Robustly Optimal Policy
For any positive upper bound on the allowable relative entropy, the set of NREE
consistent with a given policy rule will be large. How, then, can this kind of theory
provide a basis for selection of a particular policy rule? Woodford (2010) proposes
that one choose the policy that implies the highest possible lower bound for one's
welfare objective (or lowest possible upper bound for one's loss function), across the
entire set of NREE consistent with the rule, under some specied bound on the
allowable size of belief distortions. Such a \maximin" approach to policy choice is
in the spirit of the \robust control" approach to dealing with model uncertainty
advocated by Hansen and Sargent (2008).
This approach requires one to determine, for any candidate policy rule, the \worst-
case" belief distortion process, that implies an NREE that is the worst possible for the
policymaker's welfare objective, subject to the bound on the size of belief distortions
that are contemplated. As an example, suppose that the objective of policy is to




t[2t + (yt   y)2]; (4.13)
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for some relative weight  > 0 on output-gap stabilization, and some optimal output
gap y > 0; as in Clarida et al. (1999). Here the expectation E0[] used to dene
the objective refers to the probability beliefs of the policymaker, which need not be
shared by others. And let us again consider policy commitments in the simple family
(3.28).
If for simplicity we restrict attention to equilibria in which belief distortions are
common to all agents, (1.11) and (1.20) imply that
t = yt + ut + Et[mt+1t+1]
each period, which is just the NRE generalization of the \New Keynesian Phillips
curve" assumed by Clarida et al. Substituting (3.28) for the path of ination, this
implies that the output gap must satisfy
yt =   1 f(1  u)ut + u Et[mt+1ut+1]g (4.14)
in the NREE corresponding to any distortion process fmtg:
Since the path of ination is independent of belief distortions under a policy
commitment of the hypothesized type, the belief distortions that maximize (4.13)
involve a choice of the one-period-ahead distortion factors fmt+1g looking forward
from any date t so as to maximize (yt   y)2 subject to an upper bound
Rt  R; (4.15)
where Rt is dened in (4.11), and the size of R > 0 indicates the allowable degree




(yt   y)2 + tEt[mt+1 logmt+1]
subject to the constraint that Etmt+1 = 1, where yt is given by (4.14) and t is a
Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint(4.15).
If ut+1 is i.i.d. N (0; 2u), the solution to this problem is easily shown to involve a
state-contingent distortion factor
logmt+1 = + ut+1;
where





The positive root for  is optimal if yt < y
 (the most common case), while the
negative root is optimal if yt > y
: (When yt < y; the policymaker's tradeo is
made even more painful by an increase in ination expectations, that shift the short-
run Phillips curve in a way that increases the tension between the goals of keeping
ination near zero and the output gap near y; and expected ination is increased
if people exaggerate the likelihood of positive cost-push shocks. If yt > y
; instead,
the worst-case belief distortions would be ones that reduce ination expectations, by
exaggerating the likelihood of negative cost-push shocks.)
The worst-case beliefs then imply
Et[mt+1ut+1] = 
2
u = (2 R)1=2u;
taking care to select the root that implies the largest gap between yt and y
: It follows
that
jyt   yj = jy + (1  u) 1utj+ u 1(2 R)1=2u (4.16)
for all realizations of ut: Equation (4.16) shows that increasing u reduces the sensi-
tivity of yt y to cost-push shocks (as in the RE analysis), but at the cost of making
it possible for the absolute value of the gap in the absence of any cost-push shock to
be larger, as a result of belief distortions.
The upper bound for (4.13) in the case of any policy in the simple family (3.28)
is then given by
(1  ) 1[L + Lpessy ];
where
L  E[2t ] = 2u2u
is the same function of u as in the RE analysis, and
Lpessy  E[(yt   y)2]
is evaluated under the worst-case belief distortions; in both expressions the expecta-
tion is over possible realizations of ut. One observes that @L=@u = 2u
2
u; regardless
of the degree of concern for robustness; but one nds that allowance for belief dis-
tortions ( R > 0) makes the value of the derivative @Lpessy =@u less negative (or more
positive) at each value of u: Hence the value of u at which the marginal reduction
in expected losses with respect to output-gap stabilization no longer outweighs the
marginal increase in expected losses with respect to ination stabilization will be
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reached at a lower value of u under the worst-case beliefs (when R > 0) than under
the RE analysis. In fact, the upper bound for expected losses may be minimized
at u = 0; whereas complete ination stabilization is never optimal under the RE
analysis; and the optimal u remains bounded away from 1, no matter how large the
weight  on the output-gap stabilization objective may be, whereas the optimal u
approaches 1 as !1 in the RE analysis.
The \robustly optimal" policy within this simple family thus involves greater
stability of ination in the face of cost-push shocks than would be optimal if one
could be sure that people would have model-consistent expectations. This is similar
to the conclusion obtained in section 3.3.2 when analyzing alternative policies under
the assumption of adaptive learning, and again the basic reason is that variations of
ination in response to cost-push shocks make it too easy for people to mis-estimate
the average future rate of ination, causing undesirable instability in the short-run
Phillips curve tradeo.
The reasons for ination expectations to be insuciently well-anchored are some-
what dierent in the two cases: in the learning analysis, it was assumed that ination
expectations necessarily drift in response to certain observations of ination outcomes,
and a large value of u was dangerous because it increased the frequency of occurrence
of observations that would lead to signicant expectational errors; here, instead, no
precise prediction is made about what expectations must be, but a large value of u
is dangerous because it allows more signicant expectational errors to be consistent
with the assumed bound on relative entropy. Yet ultimately, the problematic feature
of the large-u policy is the same in both cases: it makes sample paths in which av-
erage observed ination diers signicantly from the actual long-run ination target
(in particular, paths in which the sample average is signicantly higher) occur too
frequently.
Woodford (2010) extends the above analysis by considering a much more exible
family of policies, in which the short-term ination target t is an arbitrary linear
function of the history of cost-push shocks, and shows how the optimal commitment
of this form diers from the optimal commitment in the RE analysis of Clarida et
al. (1999). As in the simpler exercise above, the robustly optimal policy commit-
ment involves a lower amplitude of ination surprises in response to cost-push shocks;
Woodford shows that it also involves a greater degree of commitment to subsequent
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reversal of any eects on the price level of past cost-push shocks.66 Kwon and Miao
(2012) show how a similar method can be used to characterize the robustly optimal
policy commitment for a broad class of linear-quadratic policy problems, and gener-
alize the results of Woodford (2010) to the cases of persistent cost-push shocks and of
a more general form of aggregate-supply relation that incorporates intrinsic ination
inertia.
Adam and Woodford (2012) further extend the analysis of Woodford (2010), con-
sidering policy commitments that are not necessarily expressed in terms of ination
targets that depend only on the history of exogenous disturbances. They nd that the
conclusions mentioned above continue to hold, as a description of how ination must
be expected to evolve in response to cost-push shocks under the worst-case beliefs,
even if a robustly optimal policy commitment (within the more general family) need
not require ination to evolve this way regardless of the nature of belief distortions.
In the analysis of Adam and Woodford, there is not a uniquely dened policy rule
that is robustly optimal; instead, there exists a large class of policy rules that all
imply the same dynamics under the worst-case belief distortions, and hence achieve
the same minimum upper bound for the loss function, though they may be associ-
ated with dierent TE dynamics under other kinds of distorted beliefs that are also
consistent with the relative-entropy bound.67
Among the robustly optimal policy rules is one that involves commitment to a
target criterion: the central bank uses its policy instrument to ensure that the joint
evolution of ination and output satisfy a linear relationship of the form
t + s(t   Et 1t) + y(yt   yt 1) = 0 (4.17)
66This kind of robust policy problem is compared to a alternative ways of introducing robustness
to uncertainty about the correctness of model equations into an optimal monetary stabilization
policy problem, in the context of the same linear-quadratic New Keynesian framework used here, in
Hansen and Sargent (2012).
67It should be recalled that also under the RE analysis, the optimal policy commitment is not
uniquely dened. Instead, the optimal REE dynamics are uniquely dened, while there are many
dierent policy rules that can achieve these dynamics as a determinate equilibrium outcome; the
rules dier in the behavior that they prescribe out of equilibrium, though the policy instrument
evolves in the same way in equilibrium under each of them. Under the robust policy analysis, the
dierent robustly optimal rules also dier in the sets of possible equilibrium outcomes associated
with them, since a given rule does not imply a determinate equilibrium, except under a particular
specication of the belief distortions.
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each period, where s; y are both positive coecients, that depend both on model
parameters and on the relative weight  assumed in the objective (4.13),68 and Et 1t
indicates the policymaker's forecast of ination a period earlier. Here the coecient
s > 0 multiplying the ination surprise results from the concern for robustness,
and this coecient is larger the greater the concern for robustness (as measured
by the relative-entropy bound). The presence of this term reduces the extent to
which a \cost-push shock" should be allowed to cause a surprise change in the rate
of ination, since it requires the surprise reduction in the output gap to be (1 +
s)=y times as large as the surprise increase in ination, rather than only 1=y
times as large, as under the optimal commitment assuming rational expectations
(Woodford, 2003, chap. 7). Thus one again concludes, as in the analysis of robustness
to adaptive learning dynamics in section 3.3.2, that ensuring greater robustness to
potential (modest) departures from fully model-consistent expectations requires one
to adjust the relative weights on ination and the output gap in a monetary policy
rule, in the direction of stronger relative responses to uctuations in the rate of
ination.
5 Conclusion
This review has been able to illustrate only a few of the possible methods of macroe-
conomic analysis that depart in one way or another from the complete requirements
of the rational expectations hypothesis. Rather than presenting all of the possible
specications of expectations or reviewing all of the conclusions obtained using them
in particular models, I have sought only to compare broad classes of approaches, that
dier in the respects in which they maintain or depart from particular aspects of the
knowledge assumptions maintained in the RE literature. Even this brief overview
has shown that there is a considerable range of alternative approaches, leading to
dierent conclusions about a variety of issues.
It may be asked how macroeconomic analysis can be possible with such a wide
range of candidate assumptions. One answer would be that empirical studies should
68Adam and Woodford also show how to characterize welfare-maximizing policy, when welfare is
dened by the expected utility (under the policymaker's expectations) of a representative household.
There is again a robustly optimal target criterion of the form (4.17), the coecients of which now
depend purely on model parameters.
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be undertaken to determine which of these possible specications of subjective ex-
pectations best describe observed behavior. A few studies of that kind already exist,
but the empirical literature remains at a fairly early stage. Much of the early work on
the alternatives surveyed here has been undertaken in order to clarify or criticize the
conceptual foundations of rational expectations equilibrium, rather than to provide
a positive analysis of observed phenomena; further empirical applications are much
to be desired.
Nonetheless, it is probably a mistake to suppose that empirical investigations
should identify a single model of expectations that can be judged to have been his-
torically valid, and that can then be treated as the way in which expectations must
be formed in the future, for purposes of counterfactual policy analyses. It is more
reasonable, in my view, to search for policies that should be robust to a variety of
possible specications of expectations. Of course, it is not possible (and probably
would not be desirable, even if feasible) to demand that a policy be robust to all
possible views of the world; it is therefore important that macroeconomists continue
to seek greater certainty about which models of the economy are more accurate. But
one need not settle upon a single model specication before policy analysis is possible.
Indeed, the approaches discussed in sections 2 and 4 above seek to dene classes
of reasonable specications of expectations under a given policy regime, rather than
a single correct specication; and even in the case of the econometric learning models
discussed in section 3, the identication of a best-tting learning rule for some histor-
ical data set would better be taken as providing evidence about the types of learning
rules that should be allowed for in a robustness analysis, rather than as identifying
a \true" learning rule that can relied upon in the future. If macroeconomic analysis
is approached in this spirit, then awareness of a variety of arguably reasonable speci-
cations should contribute to the robustness of the conclusions reached, rather than





















Figure 1: ODE trajectories that approximate asymptotic learning dynamics, when
interest-rate policy is constrained by the zero lower bound. The points at which the
constraint binds are those below and to the left of the line ZLB. The steady state in
which the ination target is achieved (corresponding to the origin) is a locally stable
rest point of the ODE dynamics, but there is also a second steady state (point e) at
which the ZLB constraint binds, with stable manifold SM.
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A Appendix: Details of Calculations
This appendix provides additional details of several derivations referred to in the
main text.
A.1 Derivation of the Temporary Equilibrium
Conditions
The equilibrium conditions given in the text represent linearized versions of the con-
ditions required for a temporary equilibrium in a model described more fully here.
The economy is made up of a continuum of identical innite-lived households, in-
dexed by i 2 [0; 1]: In the plan that each household i formulates in period t, it seeks
to maximize its estimate (based on subjective probabilities) of the discounted sum of




T t[u(CiT ; T )  v(H iT ; T )]: (A.1)











where cit(j) is the quantity purchased of good j and  > 1 is the elasticity of substi-
tution among dierent goods; H it is hours worked by the household in period t; and
t is a vector of exogenous disturbances that includes possible disturbances to both
the urgency of immediate consumption and the disutility of labor (that need not be
correlated, since t is a vector).
Given the assumption of a single nancial asset, a one-period riskless nominal
bond, the household's bond holdings evolve according to













where Bit is the nominal value at maturity of the bonds carried into period t, Wt
is the nominal wage, jt is nominal prots of rm j (distributed in equal shares to
the households who own the rms), pt(j) is the price of good j, and Tt is the net
nominal (lump-sum) tax obligation (assumed to be equal for all households). (Note
that here I write Ht for hours worked by the household, because of the assumption
that available hours of work are allocated equally to each household.) Each rm's
prots are given by
t(j) = pt(j)yt(j) WtHt(j);
66
where yt(j) is the quantity produced and sold of good j and Ht(j) is labor hired by
rm j. Integrating this over rms and noting thatZ 1
j=0
Ht(j)dj  Ht;








Finally, the form of the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator (A.2) implies that in the case
of an optimal allocation of household expenditure across dierentiated goods, total















is the Dixit-Stiglitz price index. As this holds for all purchasers of goods (including
the government, it is assumed), total sales revenues will similarly equalZ 1
j=0
pt(j)yt(j)dj = PtYt;
where Yt is total demand for the composite good dened in (A.2). Substituting these
expressions into (A.3), the law of motion for bond holdings can be written more
simply as
Bit+1 = (1 + it)

Bit + PtYt   PtCit   Tt

: (A.4)
The household's consumption plan can then be formulated purely as a choice of a
planned state-contingent evolution for fCiTg1T=t, and the household's perceived in-
tertemporal budget constraint (i.e., the set of plans that are believed to be feasible)
depends only on the household's initial wealth Bit and the expected evolution of the
variables fYT ; PT ; iT ; TTg1T=t:
The household's planning problem at date t is then the choice of state-contingent
paths fCiT ; BiT+1g1T=t consistent with (A.4) at all dates T  t (together with a bound
on how negative bond holdings can be asymptotically, to rule out Ponzi schemes) so
as to maximize (A.1), given the household's initial wealth Bit and its expectations
regarding the evolution of the variables fYT ; PT ; iT ; TTg1T=t outside its control. (Note
that the evolution of fHTg1T=t is also outside the household's control, under the labor
market institutions assumed in the model; but the household's consumption-planning
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problem is independent of its expectations about how much it will be working.) While
we are at present agnostic about the nature of households' expectations about the
future evolution of the variables outside their individual control (and do not assume,
in general, that households are necessarily aware of any of the structural relations
that determine such variables), we assume that households correctly understand the
constraints (A.4) that dene their own problem, and accordingly that each chooses a
plan that solves the problem just stated, under some internally consistent subjective
expectations about the evolution of the variables outside its control.
A.1.1 Subjectively Optimal Expenditure
The rst-order conditions for the problem just dened are
uC(C
i









for any state of the world that might be reached at any date T  t; where T+1 
PT+1=PT is the gross rate of ination. The household's subjectively optimal plan is
then a pair of processes fCiT ; BiT+1g1T=t satisfying (A.4) and (A.5) at all dates T  t;
together with bounds on the asymptotic growth of net nancial wealth (a transver-
sality condition) that guarantee both consistency with the borrowing limit and no
inecient overaccumulation of wealth. We can approximately characterize the opti-
mal plan, looking forward from any date t, by linearizing the conditions that implicitly
dene the optimal plan around the steady-state values of the endogenous variables
that represent a solution in the case of no random uctuations in the exogenous
states.
Assuming constant values T =  for all of the exogenous disturbances and that
expectations about the economy's deterministic evolution are correct (i.e., perfect
foresight), the structural relations (A.4) and (A.5) are consistent with a stationary
solution in which T = 1 (a zero steady-state ination rate), iT = 
 1   1 > 0,
biT  BiT=PT 1 = b; YT = Y ; CiT = C; and T  TT=PT =  with certainty for all
T  t; under the assumption that (i) the household's initial nancial wealth is given
by bit =
b;69 (ii) the value of C satises
C = (1  )b+ T    ;
and (iii) these steady-state values are also consistent with the remaining model struc-
tural relations (discussed further below), and in particular with the specications of
monetary and scal policy. We now with to solve for a solution to the structural
relations (A.4) and (A.5) near this steady-state solution, in the case of values for
the exogenous disturbances that remain near enough to the values  for all T  t; a
level of initial nancial wealth bit near enough to
b; and subjective expectations about
69Note that bit is dened as B
i
t=Pt 1 rather than B
i
t=Pt so that it is a predetermined state variable.
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the future evolution of all variables that are close enough to being correct (i.e., near
enough to model-consistency).70
We obtain a local linear approximation to the perturbed solution by solving local





; {^t  log(1 + it)  log( 1); t  log t;






; ^ t   t   Y ;
a linear approximation to (A.4) can be written in the form
b^it+1 = sb(^{t    1t) +  1(b^it + Y^t   c^it   ^ t); (A.6)
where sb  b= Y : A local linear approximation to the marginal utility of expenditure
can similarly be written in the form
log uC(C
i
t ; t) = log uC( C;
)   1(c^it   ct); (A.7)
where  > 0 is a parameter proportional to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
of expenditure, and ct is an exogenous disturbance (a shock to the urgency of private
expenditure), indicating the shift in the size of c^it required in order to maintain a
constant marginal utility of expenditure. A local linear approximation to (A.5) then
can be written in the form
c^it   ct =  (^{t   E^itt+1) + E^it [c^it+1   ct+1]: (A.8)
One can show that there is a unique solution to equations (A.6) and (A.8) for






Rearranging the terms in (A.6), we can alternatively write
b^it =  (Y^t   ^ t)  sb({^t   t) + ct + (c^it   ct) + b^it+1:






(Y^T   ^T ) + sb({^T   T ) + cT + (c^iT   cT )
o
(A.9)
70Because of the local approximation that is relied upon after this point, there is a sense in
which all of the analysis in the paper assumes \near-rational expectations." Nonetheless, while
the linearized temporary-equilibrium relations are relied upon throughout the text, bounds on the
possible expectational errors are not assumed except when additional restrictions on expectations
are explicitly introduced, as for example in section 4.2 of the text.
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But (A.8) implies that for any T > t;
E^it [c^
i
T   cT ] = (c^it   ct) + 
T 1X
s=t






T   cT ] = (1  ) 1 (c^it   ct) + (1  ) 1
1X
T=t
T+1 tE^it [^{T   T+1]:






(Y^T   ^T ) + sb({^T   T ) + cT + (1  ) 1(^{T   T+1)
o






(Y^T   ^T ) + sb({^T   T ) + (1  ) 1(^{T   T+1) + (1  ) 1(cT+1   cT )
o
+(1  ) 1c^it:
This equation can be solved for the value of c^it under the subjectively optimal plan.
This yields equation (1.1) in the text. (Note, however, that hats are omitted from all
variables in the text. That is, bit in the text refers to the perturbation variable here
denoted by b^it; and so on.)
A.1.2 Labor Supply and Wage Determination
If we instead write the law of motion (A.3) for a household's nancial wealth in real
terms, we observe that the household's intertemporal budget set looking forward from






(prior to prot distributions, taxes and transfer payments) and the expected paths
of the variables fYT ; iT ;
R
j
T (j)dj; Tg1T=t and fTg1T=t+1 outside the household's
control. Let V it (a
i
t) denote the household's subjective evaluation in period t of the
maximimum attainable value of the continuation utility (A.1) given the value of ait,
where the time subscript indicates the dependence of this function on expectations at
t regarding the variables outside the household's control. Using the envelope theorem,





t ; t) (A.10)
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where Cit is the household's optimal period t expenditure, characterized above.
Under the assumed labor market institution, then, the union supplies Ht hours of




t=t + wtHt)di  v(Ht; t);
in the case of any real wage wt  Wt=Pt: The rst-order condition for optimal aggre-




t)di  wt = vH(Ht; t):




t ; t)di  wt = vH(Ht; t): (A.11)
We can then log-linearize relation (A.11) around the same steady-state values as




(c^it   ct)di = t; (A.12)
introducing the notation
w^t  log(wt= w); t  log vH(Ht; t)  log vH( H; )




household expenditure and introducing the notation
c^t  log(Ct= C);





Substituting this into (A.12), we obtain
w^t    1(c^t   ct) = t:
This is the log-linear wage equation given in section 1.3 of the text, except that once
again hats are omitted in the notation used in the text.
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A.2 Non-uniqueness of Rationalizable Equilibrium
Here we present additional details of the calculations involved in establishing the
non-uniqueness of rationalizable equilibrium (or, failure of \eductive stability") in
the example of Guesnerie (2008), as stated in section 2.2 of the text. Under the
assumption of a monetary policy rule of the form it = t; the TE dynamics must
satisfy
vit = (1  )vt + E^itvit+1 (A.13)
for all i, as explained in the text.71 In a rationalizable TE, not only must this hold at
date t, but everyone must expect anyone else to expect anyone else ... to expect it to
hold at any future date. We wish to consider whether the RE equilibrium in which
vit = 0 for all i and all t constitutes the unique bounded process fvitg consistent with
common knowledge of (A.13). In the case that jj < 1; the solution is obvious not
unique, because in this case, there is not even a unique RE equilibrium, as is well
known; and all REE are also rationalizable TE. Here we show that even when  > 1,
so that vit = 0 is the unique bounded REE, it is possible to have a large multiplicity
of bounded rationalizable TE.
Common knowledge that (A.13) holds for all i and all t implies that the hierarchy
of beliefs at any date t must satisfy
E^i1t E^
i2
t1    E^int+jn 1vint+jn = (1  )E^i1t E^i2t1    E^int+jn 1vt+jn
+E^i1t E^
i2
t1    E^int+jn 1vint+jn+1; (A.14)
E^i1t E^
i2
t1    E^int+jn 1vin+1t+jn = (1  )E^i1t E^i2t1    E^int+jn 1vt+jn
+E^i1t E^
i2
t1    E^int+jn 1E^in+1t+jnvin+1t+jn+1; (A.15)
where t < t1 <    < tn+1 is any sequence of dates beginning with t, and i1 6= i2 6=
   6= in+1 is any sequence of households. At the same time, any hierarchy of beliefs
satisfying (A.14){(A.15) will describe a rationalizable TE. The hierarchy of beliefs
regarding the future paths of ination and the interest rate is derivable from the
hierarchy of beliefs about the fvig, using the assumption that both equation (1.8) in
the text and the policy rule are common knowledge.
One possible solution to (A.13), (A.14) and (A.15) is given by vit = ; and
E^i1t E^
i2
t1    E^int+jn 1vint+jn = ( )1 n;
E^i1t E^
i2
t1    E^int+jn 1vin+1t+jn = ( ) n
71See equation (2.2) in the text.
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for any sequences of households and dates of the kind assumed above, where  is an
arbitrary real number and
     1
(1  )
:
These beliefs satisfy all of the requirements for rationalizability for any real number
; as can be veried by substituting the candidate solution into equations (A.13),
(A.14) and (A.15) and verifying that each condition is satised.
Moreover, if 1=2 <  < 1 and  > (2   1) 1 > 1 is satised, as stated in
the text, then  > 1, and forecasts of all orders satisfy a uniform bound. There
is then (at least) a continuum of uniformly bounded rationalizable TE. Moreover, 
may represent the realization of a \sunspot" event unrelated to fundamentals, so that
there are seen to exist bounded sunspot equilibria, despite the fact that monetary
policy satises the Taylor Principle.
A.3 Restricted Perception Equilibrium
Here we explain further details of the example of a restricted perception equilibrium
in which Ricardian Equivalence fails. The policy regime assumed in the example of
section 3.1.2 implies that the dynamics of bt and st are given by
bt+1 = 
 1(bt   st) (A.16)
st = bbt + 
s
t (A.17)
where fstg is an i.i.d. random variable with mean zero and variance 2: Substitution
of (A.17) into (A.16) yields the univariate law of motion
bt+1 = bt    1st ;
where    1(1  b). Under the assumption that
0 < 1   < b < 1; (A.18)
0 <  < 1 and this law of motion implies that fbtg is stationary AR(1) process with
positive serial correlation.
It follows from this law of motion that the unconditional variance of the stationary
process is given by
E[b2] =
 12
1  2 : (A.19)
It then follows from (A.17) that
E[sb] = bE[b
2]; E[s2] = 2bE[b
2] + 2; (A.20)
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and from (A.16) that
E[bt+1st] = (  ) E[b2]: (A.21)




















where the last inequality relies upon (A.18).
The linear equation (3.12) in the text, to solve for  v, can be written in the form
A( v) = 0;
where the function A( v) is dened as the left-hand side of (3.12) minus the right-
hand side. This is a linear function of the form
A( v) = a v + b;
where
a = 1  bb > 0
as a consequence of (A.23). There will thus be a unique value of  v for which
A( v) = 0: Moreover, we observe that






where the rst inequality follows from (A.23) and the second from (A.18). Then since
A( v) is an increasing function, the zero of the function must occur for a value of  v
less than this. Hence the unique solution satises  v < 
 1   1; as asserted in the
text.
A.4 Phase Dynamics Shown in Figure 1
When the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint does not bind, the non-stochastic part






24  (1  )(1 + y)1  (1  )







  1 +  + y > 0;
allowing us to identify the matrix D. Using the elements of the matrix C indicated
by the coecients of the linear equations (3.16){(3.17) in the text, we then nd that











This matrix denes the linear ODE system given by (3.22) in the text, for the part
of the plane where the ZLB constraint does not bind.
The two rows of the matrixM  I A give the coecients of the linear equations
that dene the loci _e1 = 0 and _e2 = 0 respectively. Let the elements of M be denoted
fmijg. Then sincem21 < 0;m22 > 0; the locus _e2 = 0 is necessarily an upward-sloping
line, as shown in the gure. Furthermore, _e2 < 0 for all points in the phase plane
above this line, while _e2 > 0 for all points below it.
Because m12 cannot be signed in general, the locus _e1 = 0 may have either a





y > 1; (A.24)
i.e., consistent with the Taylor Principle, m11 > 0; which implies that _e1 > 0 for all
points to the left of this locus, while _e1 < 0 for all points to its right. In addition,





=   (1  )








so that the inverse slope de1=de2 must be greater (more positive) for the _e2 = 0
locus than for the _e1 = 0 locus. Hence the relative slopes of the two loci in the
unconstrained region are necessarily as shown in Figure 1.
It also follows from the above discussion that at all points above the _e2 = 0 locus
and to the right of the _e1 = 0 locus, trajectories must all move down and to the left;
while at all point above the _e2 = 0 locus and to the left of the _e1 = 0 locus, they
must all move down and to the right; and so on. Hence the phase dynamics in the
unconstrained region (the region above the line labeled \ZLB") must be as shown
in the gure. These sign restrictions suce to imply that in an open set around
the zero-ination steady state (point e = 0 in the gure), all trajectories converge
asymptotically to that steady state (i.e., the zero-ination steady state is locally
asymptotically stable under the ODE dynamics). If there were no ZLB constraint,
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so that equation (3.22) in the text applied globally, this steady state (which would
then be the unique rest point of the ODE system) would also be globally stable.
The equation of the locus of points at which the ZLB constraint just binds (line
ZLB in the gure) is of the form
a0e =  r < 0;
where
a0    + y (1  )  :
(This follows from equation (3.23) in the text, and our explicit solution above for
the matrix D.) Since a1; a2 > 0; this equation describes a downward-sloping straight
line, located below and to the left of the point e = 0; as shown in Figure 1. The
points above and to the right of this line constitute the values of e for which the
ZLB constraint will not bind, while below and to the left of the line, the constraint
is strictly binding (and hence the ODE system given by (3.22) in the text does not
apply).
Then since the _e2 = 0 locus is upward-sloping, as established above, it must
intersect the line ZLB at a point below and to the left of the point e = 0; as shown
in the gure. The locus _e1 = 0 is not necessarily upward-sloping (as drawn in the





=   (1  )y
[(   1) + y]( + y)
> 0:
This implies that the inverse slope of the line ZLB is necessarily more negative than
that of the locus _e1 = 0; so that the two lines also must intersect, as shown. It further
follows from our conclusion above about the relative slopes of the _e1 = 0 and _e2 = 0
loci in the unconstrained region that the point at which the locus _e1 = 0 intersects
the line ZLB must lie below and to the right of the point at which the locus _e2 = 0
intersects this line, as shown in the gure. Hence the qualitative dynamics in the
unconstrained region are as shown in the gure.
In the constrained region, the dynamics are instead dened by the alternative
linear ODE system specied in equation (3.26) of the text, where the matrix D is
obtained by substituting  = y = 0 into the expression given above for the matrix
D. This system can alternatively be written in the form
_e =  M(e  e); (A.25)
where the matrix M is obtained by substituting  = y = 0 into the expression
given above for the matrix M .
The elements of the matrix M then dene the coecients of the equations corre-
sponding to the loci _e1 = 0 and _e2 = 0 in the constrained region. Since m11;m12 < 0;
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the _e1 = 0 locus must be upward-sloping; and similarly, since m21 < 0 and m22 > 0;
the _e2 = 0 locus must be downward-sloping, as shown in Figure 1. Then given the
relative positions of the points at which these loci intersect the line ZLB; discussed
above, the two loci necessarily intersect at a point e in the interior of the constrained
region, as also shown in the gure. (As discussed in the text, this point represents a
second, deationary steady state.)
The signs of the elements of M also imply that in the region above the _e1 = 0
locus but below the _e2 = 0 locus, all trajectories must move up and to the right, and
so on. In particular, they imply that all trajectories starting in the grey region of the
gure must move down and to the left. Hence all trajectories starting in this region
remain trapped in it forever.
The signs of the elements of M also imply that the determinant of the matrix is
negative, implying that the matrix must have two real eigenvalues, one positive and
one negative. It then follows from standard results regarding linear ODE systems
that the stable manifold of the system dened by equation (A.25) is one-dimensional:
it corresponds to a line (the line SM shown in Figure 1) passing through point e
along which trajectories converge asymptotically to point e starting from any point
on this line. Instead, all trajectories starting from points o this line diverge from
the line, and hence diverge from the steady state e, which is thus locally unstable
under the dynamics dened by (A.25).
Moreover, at any points in the constrained region that are below the line SM but
above the _e2 = 0 locus, _e2 < 0; so that trajectories starting at any such point must
eventually enter the grey region, unless they leave the constrained region (i.e., they
cross the line ZLB, in which case equation (A.25) would no longer apply). Similarly,
trajectories starting at any point below the line SM but to the right of the _e1 = 0
locus must eventually enter the grey region, unless they leave the constrained region.
Thus all trajectories beginning in the constrained region and below the line SM must
eventually enter and be permanently trapped in the grey region, unless they leave
the constrained region before entering the grey region.
It remains to determine whether trajectories beginning in the constrained region
below the line SM can ever leave the constrained region. To answer this, we need
to examine whether trajectories point into or out of the constrained region, at points
along the line ZLB that denes the boundary of the region. The line ZLB consists
of all points e such that
a0e =  r; (A.26)
the constrained region consists of all points e for which a0e is more negative than
this. Thus at any point on the line ZLB, the trajectory points out of the constrained
region if a0 _e > 0; and into the constrained region if instead a0 _e < 0: At points between
the point where the _e2 = 0 locus intersects the line ZLB and the point where the
_e1 = 0 locus intersects it, both elements of _e are positive, and hence a
0 _e > 0: Hence
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the trajectories all point outside the constrained region along this interval, as shown
in Figure 1.
Consider instead the point where the line SM intersects the line ZLB; if such a
point exists. The line SM consists of all points e of the form
e = e + u; (A.27)
for arbitrary (positive or negative) values of the coecient ; where u is the right
eigenvector of the matrix M corresponding to the positive eigenvalue. Thus
M(e  e) = (e  e) (A.28)
for some  > 0: Then at any point on the line SM; we must have
a0 _e =  a0M(e  e)
=   a0(e  e);
using (A.25) and (A.28). Because e is in the interior of the constrained region,
a0(e   e) > 0 for all points on the line ZLB dened by (A.26). Hence at a point
that is both on the line SM and on the line ZLB, we must have a0 _e < 0; and the
trajectory of the ODE system through this point points into the constrained region,
as shown in Figure 1.
Now suppose that the stable manifold SM intersects the line ZLB at a point
below and to the right of the point where the _e1 = 0 locus intersects ZLB; as shown
in the gure. Because a0 _e =  a0M(e   e) is a linear function of e; the fact that
it is positive at the point of intersection with the _e1 = 0 locus but negative at the
point of intersection with SM implies that it must also take an even more negative
value at all points on the line ZLB that are below and to the right of the intersection
with SM . Hence the ODE trajectories point into the constrained region at all such
points, as shown in Figure 1, and it is not possible for a trajectory that begins in the
constrained region and below the line SM to ever leave the constrained region.
Alternatively, suppose that the stable manifold intersects the line ZLB at a point
above and to the left of the point where the _e2 = 0 locus intersects ZLB: In this case,
the fact that a0 _e > 0 at the point of intersection with the _e2 = 0 locus while a0 _e < 0
at the point of intersection with SM implies that we must have a0 _e < 0 at all points
on the line ZLB above and to the left of the intersection with SM . Hence the ODE
trajectories again point into the constrained region at such points, and again it is not
possible for a trajectory that begins in the constrained region and below SM to ever
leave the constrained region.
Finally, suppose that the stable manifold SM is exactly parallel to the line ZLB
(the case in which a0u = 0). In this case, SM never intersects ZLB, and trajectories
that begin below SM can never approach the boundary of the constrained region.
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Thus in all possible cases, we conclude that trajectories that begin in the constrained
region and below the line SM remain forever in the constrained region, as stated
in the text (and illustrated in Figure 1). It follows that all such trajectories must
eventually enter the grey region and remain trapped there forever, as stated in the
text.
A.5 An Example of Rational Belief Equilibria
Here we provide additional details of the calculations referred to in the example
discussed in section 4.1 of the text. It follows from the denition of the subjective











(This can be obtained, for example, by \solving forward" equation (1.15) in the text,
and then using equation (1.11) in the text to substitute for the E^jt p

t+k terms in terms













Then substituting the expressions given in the text for the subjective expectations
E^jt t+k and E^
j


















This is not, however, a complete solution, as the expression obtained for 2 is a
function of ; the sum 1 + 2:
The solutions (A.30){(A.31) imply that
 = 1 + g; (A.32)
where 1 and g are both explicit functions of the model parameters given above.
We further note that under our assumptions that 0 < ; ;  < 1; 0   < 1; and
;  > 0; the coecients of the linear equation (A.32) satisfy 1 > 0 and g < 1: Hence
the equation has a unique solution, given by
 =
1
1  g > 0: (A.33)
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Substituting this solution into (A.30) and (A.31), we obtain unique solutions for 1
and 2.
We thus obtain a unique solution for the TE dynamics under beliefs of the pos-
tulated form. The complete system of equations describing these dynamics consists
of equations (4.1){(4.2) in the text, specifying the exogenous evolution of the natural
rate of output Y nt ; the equation
Yt =  Yt 1 + (1  )Y nt (A.34)
for the dynamics of the central bank's estimate of the permanent component; equation
(4.6) in the text for the evolution of the aggregate belief state t; and equations (4.8){
(4.9) in the text, giving the TE dynamics of ination and the output gap, where the
value of  in these equations is given by (A.33).
Note that this does not mean that there is a unique equilibrium in this model
consistent with the rational belief postulate. The assumption, in this derivation, that
the aggregate belief state follows dynamics of the form (4.6) is an arbitrary one | not
only our assumption that t is an AR(1) process, but that it evolves independently of
the fundamental disturbances | chosen purely to illustrate the kind of calculations
that are involved in verifying the existence of an RBE. The assumption that each rm
j regards its subjective belief state zjt as an accurate observation of the current value
of Y nt ; rather than simply a random state that provides information about Y
n
t , is also
an extreme special case. By relaxing either or both of these assumptions, we could
construct a very large class of alternative RBE for this model, so that the predictions
about such matters as the serial correlation of observed uctuations in ination are
not nearly as sharp as the calculation above might suggest.
It may be useful to compare this example of RBE uctuations to the REE dynam-




1  yt + Etp

t+1;
or alternatively (using equation (1.11) in the text), that
t = yt + Ett+1
= (Yt   Yt) + ( Yt   Y nt ) + Ett+1: (A.35)








72Recall that in this discussion, we assume that the cost-push disturbance ut is equal to zero at
all times.
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as an equation that the REE dynamics of ination must satisfy.










Et[ Yt+k   Y nt+k]: (A.36)
But since the RE forecasts of the future natural rate of output are given by equation
(4.3) in the text, one has
Et[ Yt+k   Y nt+k] = 0




( Yt   Y nt ): (A.37)




( Yt   Y nt ): (A.38)
Comparing these equations with equations (4.8){(4.9) in the text for the RBE
dynamics of ination and the output gap, one sees that the REE dynamics are given
by the same equations, but with the value  = 0 instead of the positive value given
in (A.33). Since the exogenous dynamics of the variables Yt Y nt and t are the same
in either case, this allows us to directly compare the RBE dynamics with the REE
dynamics. As discussed in the text, we see that the responses of both t and yt to
the variations in exogenous fundamentals Yt   Y nt are the same in both equilibria;
the dierence is that in the RBE dynamics, variations in the aggregate belief state
t (independent of the uctuations in fundamentals) cause additional variation in t
and yt; causing each variable to be more volatile in the RBE than it would be under
the REE dynamics.
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